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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis attempts to identify fundamental factors determining valuation of convertible 
preferred shares. After clearly identifying characteristics of the preferred shares, we reviewed the 
literature and found that there are three fundamental factors for the valuation of convertible 
preferred shares; dividend guarantee, voting rights and convertibility. To test the three 
fundamental factors, we developed six hypotheses focusing on dividends, block holding shares, 
time to conversion, leverage, market yield spread and market returns. To estimate the value of 
the preferred shares, we structured two ordinary least squares (OLS) models setting dependent 
variables as preferred share premium (Model 1: PS premium) and quarterly dividend yield of 
preferred shares (Model 2: QDYP), respectively. Based on F-stat and adjusted R-squared, Model 
1 best explains the variations of the preferred share premium and fits well to the data sets. 
This thesis found that there are significant values for convertibility and voting rights and 
these values are discounted by time and getting more valuable as approaching their conversion 
dates. Regarding the time value of convertibility and voting rights, we have found there are 
interesting arbitrage trade opportunities between the common shares and the preferred shares. 
We also concluded that there are significant values for cumulative dividends. By comparing 
values among common shares, convertible preferred shares and non-convertible preferred shares, 
we calculated that values of voting rights and dividend cumulativeness are 43% and 39% of 
common shares, respectively. This thesis provides new evidences for the value of convertibility, 
the value of voting rights and the dividend guarantee. We believe that these considerable 
corporate governance related values are largely due to weak legal protection and idiosyncratic 
corporate governance structure in Korea. 
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Controlling growth, volatility, liquidity, size, share buyback, rate environment and crises, 
we get significant regression results suggesting that on average the convertible preferred share 
premium is positively associated with leverage and time to conversion. Surprisingly, the 
convertible preferred share premium is negatively associated with the dividend yields. This is 
probably due to the voting rights recovery upon the dividend omission. For block holding, the 
bond-like non-convertible preferred shares have shown positive significant relations. This 
bondness of non-convertible preferred shares are more apparent with significant negative 
coefficients for the market yield spread and the market return. Additionally, we also documented 
a liquidity premium for the valuation of preferred shares. We think exemption of capital gains 
tax in Korea makes easiness to sell very valuable. 
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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 
Preferred shares received little attention from academia despite their repetitive issuance 
booms in the past and resilient demand in the current low interest rate environment. Recent 
issuance booms were the 2008 TARP (Troubled Asset Relief Program) capital injection into 
troubled financial institutions and General Motors Company’s $4.35bn convertible preferred 
shares issuance in 2010 (Kallberg et al., 2013). In late 2016, the Canadian preferred market saw 
signs of recovery. In September 2016, Toronto-Dominion Bank issued C$1bn of preferred shares 
which was the largest Canadian preferred share issuance (Kwon, 2016). It is worth to note that 
before 1986 Canada1 funded more than 25% of gross new investments with preferred shares 
(Fatemi et al., 2002). 
If one expands the scope beyond North America, preferred shares are more central to 
market dynamics. For example, one of Asia’s largest tech companies, Samsung Electronics, has 
a large and liquid preferred share (KO:SEP) with C$422 billion market capitalization, which is 
11% of its common share’s market capitalization. In January 2018, Korea’s leading broker Mirae 
Asset Daewoo decided to issue C$0.8 billion (21% of common shares outstanding) of new non-
convertible preferred shares. In Sweden, more than 55% of public equity issuers have dual-share 
structure of the preferred shares (Bjuggren et al., 2007). Convertible preferred shares have been 
significant funding sources in Australian market in 1990s (Davis, 1996). Given their low 
correlation to common shares and bonds and attractive dividend yield, preferred shares are 
gaining market popularity in the current globally low interest rate environment (Brzenk and Soe, 
                                                           
1 Fooladi et al. (1991) argued that with the existence of dividend tax credit Canadian firms finance more heavily 
with preferred shares than do American firms. 
2 For brevity, we convert Korean won into Canadian dollars using 900 KRW/CAD currency exchange ratio as of 
March 2018. 
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2015). Also, their hybrid nature allows intermediate risks and medium returns, which find values 
in portfolio construction (Bajaj et al., 2002; Davis, 1996). 
The limited literature on preferred shares may be due to the long silence in North 
American markets and lack of theoretical understandings on issuance rationales and valuation 
models. Despite lack of literature and theoretical discussion of preferred shares, we attempt to 
contribute to the academia by enhancing our understanding on the valuation of preferred shares. 
We chose Korean convertible preferred shares as our subject of study given data availability, 
popularity in Korean market and unique product structures such as convertibility and dividend 
cumulativeness. Expanding this analysis into other species and other markets may be an 
interesting research topic but is beyond the scope of this research. To the best of our knowledge, 
this is the first attempt to examine the valuation of convertible preferred shares in Korea using 
fundamental factors which not only focus on corporate governance but also dividends and 
convertibility. So far previous studies have been limited to corporate governance related voting 
rights without looking at dividend structures and time varying value of convertibility. 
This thesis believes there are values for the dividend, corporate governance and 
convertibility in the valuation of the convertible preferred shares. Using OLS regression, we 
found unique features of the convertible preferred shares such as dividend guarantees, 
convertibility and voting rights have significant relations with the convertible preferred share 
premium. This thesis has a following structure. In Chapter II, we first review the pre-existing 
literature on the overall preferred shares market in terms of product identity, theoretic factors 
determining their premiums and issuance rationales. In Chapter III, we then provide theoretical 
arguments and generate hypotheses to conduct empirical tests on the convertible preferred share 
premium over the common shares. In Chapter IV, we review our data and models for ordinary 
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least squares (OLS) regressions and explain our results. In Chapter V, we discuss our OLS 
results and provide their implications. In Chapter VI, we conduct robustness checks by running 
separate OLS regressions by grouping the samples based on cumulativeness of their dividends 
and dividing samples before and after the 2008 Subprime Mortgage Crisis. In Chapter VII, we 
conclude the thesis with future research suggestions. 
Overview of Korean preferred shares 
As seen in Table 1.1, there are three types3 of preferred shares that are actively traded in 
Korean market. Although we can track the preferred shares back to the late 80s, it was the 1995 
Commercial Code Amendment, which allowed the current settings of the three types of preferred 
shares. The 1995 Amendment of Commercial Code divides preferred shares in old and new 
preferred shares. First type is old preferred shares which are non-convertible with dividend yield 
of 1% more4 than common share. Second type is new non-convertible preferred shares with 
minimum dividend yield guaranteed. Third type is new convertible preferred shares which have 
convertibility with a typical time to conversion of 10 years. Before moving into literature review, 
it would be helpful for us to explain the three types of preferred shares with representative 
examples. Based on public disclosures and articles of incorporation of the sample firms, we have 
selected representative preferred shares of each type and summarized major characteristics of 
Korean preferred shares as below. 
 
                                                           
3 There is the fourth type of the preferred shares, the redeemable convertible preferred share. Given its limited 
sample size, we do not include it into our sample. We have found that JW Pharmaceutical 4, 5 and 6 redeemable 
convertible preferred shares are currently trading in the Korean market. 
4 The old preferred shares in Korea are similar to savings shares in Italy, which has following features; 1) a 
minimum dividend, equal to 5 percent of the par value, and 2) being entitled to receive common share dividend plus 
2 percent of the par value (Zingales, 1994). 
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Table 1.1 Three types of the preferred shares in Korea 
 
First, due to long issuance history and perpetuity, the old preferred share is the largest 
group among the three species of preferred shares. Samsung Electronics Preferred Share 
(KO:SEP) was issued in 1989 and is a representative example of the old non-convertible 
preferred shares with C$42 billion market capitalization. It is non-cumulative and non-voting 
without a conversion option. Dividends are declared while meeting the following three 
conditions; 1) minimum 9% of face value should be paid as dividend, 2) 1% of face value higher 
dividend should be paid than the common shares, and 3) when the dividend ratio of the common 
shares exceeds that of the preferred shares, the additional dividend on preferred shares should be 
declared in the amount equivalent to the exceeding ratio. The following is an equation that 
explains the dividends of Samsung Electronics Preferred Share: 
Equation 1.1 
Dividend old = Maximum [+9% of Face Value, CS dividend yield + 1%, CS DPS]  
When dividends are not paid to preferred shareholders, voting rights of the preferred shares are 
recovered until new dividends are declared. In the case of rights issue, bonus issue or stock 
dividend, the holders of common shares will be entitled to common shares, and the holders of 
preferred shares will be entitled to preferred shares, in proportion to their respective 
shareholdings.  
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 Second, after the 1995 Amendment of Commercial Code, the regulation allowed more 
discretion in setting dividend structures of preferred shares and thus created the second species of 
new non-convertible preferred share. Hyundai Motor Preferred Share 2 (KO:HDR) is the most 
liquid example of the new non-convertible preferred shares with C$4 billion market 
capitalization. Hyundai Motor Preferred Share 2 is non-cumulative and non-voting. It has the 
two following conditions for dividends; 1) minimum 2% of face value should be paid as 
dividend, 2) the additional dividend on preferred shares shall be declared by participating in 
distribution of dividend at the same ratio of dividend on common shares, at the time of 
distribution of dividend on common shares. The following is an equation that explains the 
dividends of Hyundai Motor Preferred Share 2: 
Equation 1.2 
Dividend new non-conv = Maximum [+2% of Face Value, CS DPS]  
When dividends are not paid, voting rights of the preferred shares are recovered until new 
dividends are declared. 
 Lastly, the 1995 Amendment of Commercial Code introduced the third type of preferred 
shares, the new convertible preferred share. Typical new convertible preferred shares are 
converted to common shares with 1:1 conversion ratio and 10 years of time to conversion5. 
Daesang Preferred Shares 3 (50477J) is a representative example of the new convertible 
preferred shares. It was issued in 2007 and converted to common shares in April 2017 with 10 
years of time to conversion. Based on its public filings, we found that it has following features. 
Minimum 3% of face value should be paid as dividend. When the dividend yield of the common 
                                                           
5 Other than 10 years of time to conversion, we have convertible preferred shares with time to conversion of 1.5 
years, 2.5 years, 3 years, 4 years and 5 years. Yet, 10 years of time to conversion composes of 44% of our 
convertible preferred shares samples. 
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shares exceeds that of the preferred shares, the additional dividend on preferred shares should be 
declared in the amount equivalent to the exceeding ratio. The following is an equation that 
explains the dividends of Daesang Preferred Share 3: 
Equation 1.3 
Dividend new conv = Maximum [+3% of Face Value, CS DPS]  
After 10 years from issuance, the preferred shares are converted into common shares with 1:1 
conversion ratio. If there are periods of not paying dividends, the conversion is delayed until the 
dividends in arrears are paid. When dividends are not paid, voting rights of the preferred shares 
are recovered until new dividends are declared at the board of directors meeting. Dividends of 
Daesang Preferred Shares 3 are cumulative. It is worth to note that in our data sample, 
convertible preferred shares show a higher portion (44%) of cumulative dividends than the 
overall sample (16%). 
When dividends are cumulative, investors are assured in their cash inflows. This yield 
guarantee feature is expected to lead into the higher values of the cumulative preferred shares 
than the non-cumulative preferred shares. Also, we expect there are values for the convertibility 
as the conversion will provide voting rights and better market liquidity. Based on this, the new 
convertible preferred share, Daesang Preferred Shares 3 should be valued the highest among the 
three types of the preferred shares. In data section, we will examine this valuation question 
estimating the convertible preferred share premiums compared to the common shares in large 
enough panel data. 
In Table 1.2, we have illustrated product characteristics of Daesang’s common shares and 
three preferred shares. Dividends have been paid in line with corresponding dividend formula. 
Dividend formula’s benchmark is face value rather than market yield. While Daesang Preferred 
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Share 1 is non-convertible and non-cumulative, both Daesang Preferred Share 2 and 3 are 
convertible with 10 years of time to conversion and cumulative. Daesang Preferred Share 2 and 3 
have paid cumulative dividends when they resumed dividend payment in 2010 after missing two 
years of dividends during the 2008 Subprime Mortgage Crisis. 
Table 1.2 Illustration of representative preferred shares - Daesang case 
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In addition to the cumulativeness, it is worth to note that the conversion of Daesang 
Preferred Share 2 has been delayed for 2 years, where the conversion date has moved from the 
original year 2009 to a later year of 2011. This is due to the 2008 and 2009 dividend misses in 
the middle of the 2008 Subprime Mortgage Crisis. This “conversion delay ption” is valuable to 
the issuers but negative to convertible preferred shareholders. This is obvious when we see the 
convertible preferred share premium drops to -27% to a lowest level in 2010 when the issuers 
missed two consecutive dividends and delayed the conversion for two years. 
In Chart 1.1, we have drawn share prices of Daesang Preferred Share 3 along with 
Daesang common share for 3 years of time window. In the thin broken line, we have also 
calculated the convertible preferred share premium over the common share. With the thick 
broken line, we plotted Daesang Preferred Share 3. In the continuous line, we plotted Daesang 
common share. With three circles, we indicated three ex-dividend dates for 2015, 2016 and 2017. 
 
Chart 1.1 Daesang Preferred share 3 case study: Premium and Ex-dividend dates 
Chart 1.1 presents 3 years of time series data of the convertible preferred share premium of a major Korean food 
manufacturing company Daesang. Along with the time series data, we highlighted ex-dividend dates for the last 
three years until Daesang Preferred Share 3’s conversion in April 2017. We plotted three price information; Daesang 
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common share price (C/S), Daesang Preferred Share 3 price (P/S 3) and Daesang Preferred Share 3’s premium over 
the common share (PS Premium-RHS). Prices are in Korean won per share, while the convertible preferred share 
premium is in percentage. 
There are two interesting patterns to highlight. First, the convertible preferred share 
premium gets higher as the ex-dividend dates approach, and then it moves back into deeper 
discount after the ex-dividend dates. This implies that there may be arbitrage trade opportunities 
between the convertible preferred share and the common share. In other words, some investors of 
Daesang may buy into Daesang Preferred Share 3 as they approach the ex-dividend dates, and 
then they switch to the common shares after ex-dividend dates. Theoretically, this could create a 
profitable and visible long-short strategy between Daesang common shares (long) and Daesang 
Preferred Share 3 (short). 
Second, the convertible preferred shares premium approaches zero as the time to 
conversion diminishes. Despite a few spikes, the convertible preferred share premium remains 
around the zero levels from early 2016 to its conversion in April 2017. Moreover, the arbitrage 
opportunities between Daesang Preferred Share 3 and its common share seem to be less likely 
during this period. In our understanding, this means that the value discounts regarding the 
conversion and the voting rights are narrowing as there are less time left before conversion. 
These observations suggest a long-short strategy between the common share and the convertible 
preferred shares can be profitable particularly if it is initiated early after the issuance of the 
convertible preferred shares and closed when conversion is approximately one and half years 
away. 
 Given the observations from Chart 1.1, it is compelling to examine whether these 
observations are consistent across other cases. For this purpose, we picked Hyundai Steel as 
another case. This is a manufacturing cyclical company, Hyundai Steel’s convertible preferred 
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shares were converted in March 2010 shortly after the 2008 Subprime Mortgage Crisis which 
caused both the common share and the convertible preferred share prices to trend upwards as the 
conversion date approached. As seen in Chart 1.2, the observations made from Chart 1.1 can be 
repeated in the case of Hyundai Steel. 
 
Chart 1.2 Hyundai Steel Preferred Share case study: Premium and Ex-dividend dates 
Chart 1.2 presents 3 years of time series data of the convertible preferred share premium of a major cyclical steel 
maker Hyundai Steel. Along with the time series data, we highlighted ex-dividend dates for the last three years until 
Hyundai Steel Preferred Share’s conversion in March 2010. We plotted three price information; Hyundai Steel 
common share price (C/S), Hyundai Steel Preferred Share price (P/S) and Hyundai Steel Preferred Share’s premium 
over the common share (PS Premium-RHS). Prices are in Korean won per share, while the convertible preferred 
share premium is in percentage. 
Besides the arbitrage opportunities and the price convergence, we also found another 
interesting pattern from Chart 1.2. In November 2008 when the 2008 Subprime Mortgage Crisis 
had the worst impact on the stock market, the Hyundai Steel Preferred Share was traded at the 
largest discount to Hyundai Steel Common Shares. We propose that this is due to “flight to 
liquidity” phenomena observed by Amihud (2002). We will attempt to provide theoretical 
explanation for this phenomenon in the following chapters. 
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CHAPTER II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Hybrid-nature of preferred shares 
Despite the significant market interest, researchers do not have consensus regarding the 
theoretical foundation and valuation methodology of convertible preferred shares. Modern 
textbooks do not have an agreed upon view about preferred shares’ identity and valuation models 
(Koller et al., 2005; Kieso et al., 2004; Copeland et al., 2005). In a text book widely read by 
financial analysts, Koller et al. (2005) highlight preferred shares’ dividend perpetuity and suggest 
“valuing preferred shares as unsecured debt discounting the expected preferred dividends in 
perpetuity at the cost of unsecured debt.” In contrast, researchers emphasizing accounting 
features consider the preferred shares as equity given the fact that preferred dividends allow 
dividend arrearage without causing default risks (Kieso et al., 2004; Emanuel, 1983). 
The above textbooks focus on one-sided valuation method and emphasize classification 
of preferred share either into bond or equity. Instead of focusing on the bond-equity dichotomy, 
we emphasize the hybrid nature of the preferred shares and assume that a single preferred share 
may be trading like bond or equity depending on fundamental factors. We are also more 
interested in the valuation of the convertible preferred shares, as measurement of the valuation 
gap between the common shares and the convertible preferred shares will allow us to better 
understand the value of theoretic components of preferred shares, which are difficult to observe 
in a comparison between a perpetual fixed-dividend preferred share and common shares. This 
research question will be examined by indirect estimation of the convertible preferred share 
premium over the common shares, because the major differences between the common shares 
and the convertible preferred shares are dividend guarantees, voting rights and time to 
conversion. 
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Remembering the celebrated Miller-Modigliani irrelevance theory, one may wonder 
about any values in our inquiry into the value of dividend, voting rights and convertibility. Miller 
and Modigliani (1961) argued, “[v]alues are determined solely by "real" considerations- in this 
case the earning power of the firm's assets and its investment policy - and not by how the fruits 
of the earning power are 'packaged' for distribution.” However, our examination into the 
previous literature suggests that there are significant valuation discrepancies between seemingly 
same assets including dual-class shares and common-preferred shares. Empirical studies on dual-
class shares and preferred shares suggest that it is not unusual to observe significant valuation 
gaps between voting and non-voting shares. Zingales (1994) estimates the value of voting shares 
is more than 80% higher than the value of non-voting shares listed on the Milan Stock Exchange. 
Fatemi and Krahnen (2000) find that the common share premium over the preferred shares in 
Germany is more than 40%. Levy (1982) finds that the Israeli market shows more than 100% 
voting premium for dual-class shares. Empirical study by Nenova (2003) suggests that the voting 
right premium in Korea is 48% of firm value in the samples including the financial crisis of 1997. 
We believe there exist values for dividend guarantees, voting rights and convertibility and 
attempt to test them by indirectly measuring the convertible preferred shares premium over the 
common shares. 
Determinants of the convertible preferred shares premium 
We found the discussions of Bildersee (1973), Ingersoll (1977) and Fatemi and Krahen 
(2000) very useful in understanding the determinants of the common share premium. Each 
scholar pays attention to stability, convertibility and voting rights, respectively. In his empirical 
study on performance of preferred shares, Bildersee (1973) suggests low quality preferred shares 
with high beta behave like equity, while high quality preferred shares with low beta behave like 
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bond (Bildersee, 1973). Bildersee also sees preferred shares experience less systematic risks than 
common shares. We find that a major driver for the less systematic risks is the higher dividend 
yields of the preferred shares on the back of stable cash flow. Some preferred shares also have 
dividend guarantee features such as dividend cumulativeness. This assures much stable cash flow 
from preferred shares. 
Ingersoll (1977) believes that the convertible preferred shares have call optionality and 
the conversion price and the firm value should be considered in valuation. Ingersoll suggests that 
a convertible preferred share may be traded like equity when its firm value is high given higher 
conversion possibilities. On the other hand, a convertible preferred share with low firm value 
should be traded like bond. Convertible preferred shares have similarities with European call 
options6, which have potential conversion options to common shares with fixed maturities. The 
convertibility feature is a sweetener to the preferred shares and should have value. Lee and 
Figlewicz (1999) even call the convertible preferred shares as “delayed equity” or “backdoor 
equity financing.” 
However, Mais et al. (1989) suggest that the conversion of convertible preferred shares 
into common shares reduces firm leverage and signals negatively. Also, conversion of non-
voting preferred shares into voting shares leads into the dilution of voting rights, which has 
adverse equity valuation effect. However, the voting rights dilution is not necessarily negative, as 
the conversion allows more financial flexibility by removing contingent claims and restrictive 
conditions (Pinegar and Lease, 1986). We will test the value of convertibility by analyzing the 
convertible preferred share premium with time to conversion, to see how the value of 
convertibility is reflected in the convertible preferred share premium. 
                                                           
6 This thought came from the invaluable discussions with Dr. Fan Yang. 
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In addition to dividend and convertibility, Fatemi and Krahnen (2000) in their empirical 
study of German preferred shares propose that the common share premium over preferred shares 
is positively related to ownership concentration (Fatemi and Krahnen, 2000). They focus on the 
supply side of the common share premium, where investors are competing for voting rights. 
They seem to be inspired by Zingales (1994), who argues that the market competition for limited 
voting rights is the major driver for the voting rights premium. The study by Fatemi and Krahnen 
(2000) helps us to develop another important hypothesis that when the management controls the 
company with large shareholdings, the premium of preferred shares decreases or vice versa. We 
believe the German case study may have implications for the Korean market. 
However, we may flip this logic to the other direction. Since preferred shares lack voting 
rights while they provide higher dividend payout, a company’s management with weak 
ownership control may temporarily halt dividend payments to trigger equity value in preferred 
shares. This suggests that lack of a controlling stake at a company creates an option to trigger 
equity value in preferred shares. Furthermore, the larger control imposes greater agency costs on 
the firm value (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The private benefits to the largest shareholders 
increase along with shareholding stake. In this case, the premium of preferred shares should 
increase with the larger shareholding. We also consider this possibility in our hypothesis building 
below.  
Issuance rationales for preferred shares 
 This study focuses on valuation of Korean convertible preferred shares to indirectly 
measure the values of dividend, voting rights and convertibility by estimating the convertible 
preferred share premium over the common shares (the convertible preferred share premium). A 
deeper look into issuance rationales would build more solid theoretical foundation for our 
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approach. From the previous literature, we found that tax benefits and corporate governance have 
been the major motivations for the management to issue preferred shares.7 We review each 
rationale and suggest implications for our study on the valuation of Korean convertible preferred 
shares. 
Tax benefits 
Tax regulation changes have exerted significant influence on companies to issue 
preferred shares, by providing tax deductibles and redefining tax base. Regulators have actively 
used preferred shares as effective policy channels, providing strong tax incentives. By reviewing 
Korea tax code and market incidences, we found two cases which provided strong tax incentives; 
dividends received deduction and the 2014 dividend income tax. 
 As presented in Table 2.1, the Korean tax regime currently has dividends received 
deduction (KPMG, 2015). The dividends received deduction is designed to avoid double taxation 
on dividend income received by a company from another company. The dividend received 
deduction ranges from 30% to 100% depending on the shareholding percentage of the holding 
company. It may not be a coincidence that in Korea most of the preferred shares issuance are 
issued by conglomerates having holding company structures (Claessens et al., 2000). Because 
dividends are the major method of income transfer from subsidiaries to holding companies, the 
dividend received deduction would be attractive tax incentive for high dividend paying 
companies. 
 
                                                           
7 Another persuasive issuance rational is to strengthen capital adequacy ratio of banks (Howe and Lee, 2006). From 
1996, the Federal Reserve allowed banks to include preferred shares into the measurement of Tier 1 capital 
(Frischmann et al., 1999). Issuance of preferred shares by financial firms are beyond the scope of this study. In our 
samples, we excluded financial firms. 
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Table 2.1 Dividends received deduction in the Korean tax regime 
 
Furthermore, the Korean tax regime introduced the 2014 dividend income tax benefit to 
encourage firms’ increased dividend payout. Before the 2014 dividend income tax benefit, the 
Korean tax regime combined interest income and dividend income. When the total income 
exceeds KRW20 million (c. C$22 thousand), comprehensive taxation with a higher tax rate up to 
the maximum of 38% was imposed. After the 2014 tax benefit, tax payers may separate the 
dividend income from the interest income with only 9% tax rate on dividends. Major 
beneficiaries of the 2014 dividend income tax benefit are the largest shareholders and the high 
net worth entities who exert significant influence on firms’ dividend policies (Yonhap News, 
2014). Since preferred shares structurally have higher dividends than common shares, such 
favorable tax policies have been tailwinds for preferred shares investment in Korea. However, 
the 2014 dividend income tax benefit has been closed without extension in 2017 after concerns 
that these regulations provide excessive benefits to the high net worth entities. This argument 
supports the proposition that the preferred shares are favorably traded by the high net worth 
entities and the largest shareholders, who have keen interests in reducing tax burdens. 
Due to abundant literature in North America regarding the taxation of preferred shares, 
we analyze the tax benefit rationale using the American experience and suggest implications for 
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Korean cases. There are three historical incidences in the United States that we saw regulatory 
tailwinds to preferred shares issuance. First, the Life Insurance Company Income Tax Act of 
1959 allowed insurance companies to actively invest into equity market through preferred shares, 
by relaxing conservative and restrictive capital regulations. The Act contributed to noticeable 
demand increase for new preferred shares issuance (Fischer and Wilt, 1968; Sorensen and 
Hawkins, 1981). Because of their hybrid nature, preferred shares have been used as supplements 
to high-yield bonds within which conservative asset management policies of life insurers were 
restricted. 
Second, the U.S. Federal tax regulation permits 70% (85% in the past) of dividends 
income as deductibles for the corporate income tax (Fischer and Wilt, 1968; Sorensen and 
Hawkins, 1981; Fooladi and Roberts, 1986; Ravid et al., 2003). On the back of tax deductibles, 
effective corporate tax rate on the dividend income for the U.S. companies could be less than 14% 
(45 percent x (1-0.70)), which encouraged them to be active buyers of preferred shares (Fooladi 
and Roberts, 1986). Given the tax deductibles, researchers suggest high quality preferred shares 
are mostly held by corporations or institutions who are tax sensitive (Chen and Sauer, 1997). 
These tax-driven long-term investors tend to make the preferred shares more stable. This is in 
line with the dividend received deduction tax code in Korea, which also provides strong 
incentives in the issuance of preferred shares in Korea. The dividend received deduction tax code 
effectively addresses the weakness of the preferred shares compared to bonds whose interest 
expenses are deductible unlike preferred shares. 
Furthermore, the U.S. tax authority introduced Tax Reform Act 1986 accounting rule 
change regarding foreign tax credit, which limited the tax favored status of debt but introduced 
new incentives to issue alternative financing instruments, preferred shares. In response to the rule 
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change, the U.S. Corporations substitute debt with preferred shares, which maintain the favored 
status regarding the foreign tax credit but share similar characteristics of debt (Callahan et al., 
2001). Researchers confirm this rationale with an industry survey, where Coca-Cola informed 
the researchers that its main motivation for issuance of preferred shares was the foreign tax credit 
rule change (Collins and Shackleford, 1992). We see a similar tax policy in Korea, which 
discourages debt issuance by weakening tax exemption on interest expenses. Fatemi et al. (2002) 
observe that Korean firms with borrowing over 50% of their net worth are excluded from tax 
deduction of interest expenses. Firms have strategically responded to the tax incentive on the 
preferred shares. 
M&A strategies, value of voting rights and agency cost 
Convertible preferred shares have not been actively issued in North America, while 
many preferred shares in the international market have convertible features and are actively 
traded. We believe this gap between North American markets and international markets is 
mainly due to corporate governance concerns. La Porta et al. (2000) argue that agency costs and 
corporate governance are related and countries with less legal protection suffer greater agency 
costs. According to La Porta et al. (2000), countries with the Civil Law system like France tend 
to have weaker legal protection. Korean legal regime belongs to the Civil Law system in contrast 
to the Anglo-Saxon Common Law system. 
In M&A, preferred shares can be used as anti-takeover measures with reduced service 
costs. Since convertible preferred shares have recoverable voting rights, potential M&A target 
management can effectively use the convertible preferred shares as an M&A defence and 
decrease the attractiveness of the target (Collins and Shackelford, 1992; Houston and Houston, 
1990). Convertible preferred shares may function as a poison pill strategy when convertible 
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preferred shares are issued and held by the “friendly” investors (Davis, 1996). Yet, one notes that 
converted voting rights of preferred shares will remain minority to the controlling common 
shares and provide no meaningful value (Emanuel, 1983). In general, converted preferred shares 
consist of less than 20% of total shares outstanding, which may not be enough to exert 
significant influence on corporate actions. 
In contrast to the previous discussions, some global companies like Samsung Electronics 
have controlling shareholders with less than 20% stakes8, where even a relatively small portion 
of convertible preferred shares (i.e. 5-10% of total shares outstanding) may exert significant 
influence on the shareholders’ meetings (Claessens et al., 2000; Lemmon and Lins, 2003). From 
studies on dual class listings across countries, Nenova (2003) finds that value of the voting rights 
is 48% of the firm value in Korea. In Korea, controlling shareholders control their firms with 
smaller stakes, while value of voting rights remains high enough. 
This peculiar situation in Korea leads us to review this study’s implications for agency 
cost theory. Using the 1998 Asian Crisis data, an empirical study on the stock return and the firm 
control ownership concludes that the stock returns are lower when the management has more 
control (Lemmon and Lins, 2003). The management with the higher degree of control has greater 
ability to take private benefits from minority shareholders (Zingales, 1994). Based on this, we 
reason that the agency cost will be greater for the firms with the larger block shareholding. 
Villalonga and Amit (2006) conclude that firm value is a decreasing function of management 
ownership of voting rights. 
                                                           
8 As of September 2017, Samsung Life and other affiliated companies control Samsung Electronics with 20.0% 
stake. 
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It will be interesting to examine whether this agency cost theory will be also applicable 
to the convertible preferred shares premium in Korea. Davis (1996) argues that the convertibility 
of the convertible preferred shares is a swap contract that transfers wealth from the common 
shareholders to the preferred shareholders, and the swap contract dilutes the agency costs 
imposed on firm values. Al-Suhaibani et al. (2013) also support this perspective by proposing 
that the preferred shares reduce conflicts of interests by clearly assigning voting rights and 
dividends among shareholders. This allows us to expect the dilution of agency costs with 
convertible preferred shares. It is probable that this would expand the convertible preferred share 
premium as the dilution of agency costs will be applicable to the convertible preferred shares and 
the common shares. Examining this proposition is beyond the scope this study. 
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CHAPTER III. THEORETICAL ARGUMENTS AND HYPOTHESES 
This research examines the difference in price of preferred shares and common shares of 
the same issuer. The unique nature of preferred shares in the Korean market makes this analysis 
interesting. As noted earlier, the three kinds of preferred shares in the Korean market pay 
dividends based on the dividends paid by common shares. As shown by Table 1.1 in Chapter I, 
preferred share dividends are either greater than or equal to common share dividends. The 
purpose of this research is to find what factors other than dividend payments affect the difference 
in share prices. This objective is interesting given that the most important benefits from common 
or preferred share ownership are the dividends. Financial theory suggests that the value of any 
financial asset is determined as the present value of all future cash flows. Dividends are the cash 
flows promised to common shares and preferred shares. Therefore, if all else are equal, the 
preferred dividend premium we observe in the Korean market should lead to a price premium. 
This argument leads to our first hypothesis. 
Table 1.1 Three types of the preferred shares in Korea 
 
Hypothesis 1. The preferred dividend yield gap (preferred share yield minus the common share 
yield) is positively related to the price premium of convertible preferred shares 
over common shares. 
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Determining the value of common shares as the present value of all future dividend 
payments has been challenged by many arguments suggesting that common share prices may be 
temporarily affected by company specific or market-wide factors. The irrelevance theory of the 
Miller-Modigliani (1961) suggests that the dividend policy should not have any significant 
impact on the common share premium (Richardson and Thompson, 1986). Under this theory, if 
management pays dividends now or reinvests the cash in projects and pays dividend later, the 
investor should be indifferent to dividends under certain conditions. One of these conditions is 
the growth rate of the common shares. La Porta et al. (2000) argue that higher growth firms tend 
to pay less dividends delaying cash distribution to the future while pursuing current investment 
opportunities. If the firm retains the cash to invest in positive net present value projects, the share 
price will grow and the dividends that will be paid in the future will be higher. However, if the 
objective of holding common and preferred shares is long term, and the preferential dividend 
payment to preferred shares will continue with future dividend payments, then the growth rate of 
the common shares should be the same as the growth rate of preferred shares. 
Another theory that affects the importance of dividends in determining the value of 
common shares is the clientele effect. As we have discussed in the tax effect section, 
corporations and institutions are major buyers of the preferred shares given the higher and stable 
income streams paid by preferred shares, and the tax advantages to preferred share dividends as 
opposed to interest from bonds. Another argument for higher dividend now as opposed to later is 
consistent with the famous statement; “a bird in the hand is worth more than one in the bush” 
(Black and Scholes, 1974). This argument suggests that shareholders prefer the certainty of 
receiving dividends now instead of the promise to receive dividends in the future. This clientele 
effect should have the same direction of hypothesis 1 that the higher dividend yield of the 
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preferred shares should lead to higher price premium for preferred shares. The preferred shares 
have covenants to guarantee more favorable dividends than the common shares. 
On the other hand, Baker and Wurgler (2004) develop the “catering theory” which argues 
a reverse causality suggesting that “dividends are highly relevant to share price, but different 
directions at different times.” Financial institutions pressure convertible preferred share issuers to 
pay higher dividends to compensate them for the weak potential of capital gains. Given the small 
size of preferred share issues in the market, active trading for short-term capital gains may not be 
feasible for financial institutions. Instead, some tax-exempt financial institutions will find higher 
yields of preferred shares attractive. This will make a “buy-and-hold” strategy an optimal 
strategy for the long-term institutional investors. Although the catering theory is disputable to 
some extant (DeAngelo et al., 2006), this theory may allow an opposite outcome to what 
hypothesis 1 predicts. This may be applicable to the convertible preferred shares premium given 
that in Korea the major demanders of the preferred shares are financial institutions like insurers 
or pension investors who are more focused on stable incomes rather than capital gains. 
Lastly, Chay and Moon (2005) find an interesting result on the relation between dividend 
payments and common share premium. In their study, they find that dividend paying preferred 
shares showed premium before the 1998 Asian Financial Crisis, while they are traded in 
discounts after the 1998 Crisis. They explain these contrasting results based on the voting rights 
trigger clauses on preferred shares. As discussed before, dividend misses trigger the recovery of 
the voting rights for preferred shares. After the 1998 Asian Financial Crisis, many Korean 
companies experienced frequent dividend misses and saw their preferred shares recovering 
voting rights. Market seems to have provided voting rights premium on the preferred shares with 
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dividend misses. Unlike Chay and Moon (2005), we will test hypothesis 1 with this possibility 
using a continuous variable of the dividend yields rather than a dummy variable. 
Hypothesis 2.  Management control over voting rights may lead to a higher or lower price 
premium of preferred shares over common shares depending on whether the 
supply side effects are weaker or stronger than the effects of agency costs.  
Hypothesis 2 is the result of the supply side theory of Zingales (1994). The supply side 
theory assumes that the managers compete with shareholders to maintain control9. When they 
have insufficient controlling shares, the managers provide higher premium to the voting shares. 
When the management have complete control of the firm, the voting premium decreases. Using 
this theory, Fatemi and Krahen (2000) suggest a firm’s corporate governance issues, such as 
management control, exert significant influence on the valuation of preferred shares. When 
management controls a significant majority of voting rights, negotiating with minority 
shareholders of common shares is the only way for outsiders to increase their influence over 
management. Given the difficulty of such negotiations, management can issue common shares 
without risking loss of control. Therefore, the supply of preferred shares will be small. In 
contrast, when management does not have sufficient voting rights, management may consider 
convertible preferred shares to increase capital resources without risking a dilution of its control. 
This tendency will increase the supply of preferred shares and reduce the preferred share 
premium. 
On the other hand, Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that the larger the block holding 
controlled by management the larger will be the agency costs consumed by management on 
                                                           
9 We need to note that unlike North America in Korea the management tends to be identical to the largest 
shareholders. 
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perks and self-dealings (Linn and Pinegar, 1988). At the same time, preferred shares allow 
dividend arrearage and are subject to less default risks given its seniority to common shares. 
Therefore, the agency costs of management control will affect preferred shares to a lesser degree 
than common shares (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Thus, the larger the block controlled by 
management the higher the preferred price premium. This is opposite to the result predicted by 
the supply side hypothesis explained earlier. In our OLS regression, we will test hypothesis 2 by 
focusing on the signal of the regression coefficients. 
Hypothesis 3. The preferred share premium is positively related to the time remaining to 
conversion.  
Convertible preferred shares are essentially common shares with a delay. Before 
conversion, they are preferred shares with no voting rights but receive preferential dividend 
payments. Therefore, if the dividend differential leads to a positive preferred share premium, we 
would expect that the longer the time to conversion the more benefits the preferred shareholders 
will have from their assets and the higher will be the premium. Based on this logic, the 
convertible preferred share premium will decrease as conversion approaches. 
An interesting feature of some convertible preferred shares is that if dividends are in 
arrears, the preferred shares will become voting shares and conversion is delayed until the arrears 
dividends are paid. Therefore, convertible preferred shares have an option like feature by which 
management at its discretion can exercise the option of delaying conversion by delaying 
dividend payments. Management will exercise this option when it is advantageous to the 
company or disadvantageous to the preferred shareholders. As time to conversion approaches the 
value of this option will increase and it will increase the preferred share premium. 
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The Daesang preferred share 3 case study in Chart 3.1 demonstrates that the convertible 
preferred share premium increases as it approaches the conversion date and less time left to 
conversion. This suggests that the lack of voting rights and other factors that differentiate 
common shares from preferred shares are contributing significantly and negatively to a preferred 
share discount. With long time left before conversion, the voting right is deeply discounted. As 
there are less time left to the conversion, the voting right discount narrows and approaches to 
zero. This speculation may result in the opposite result to what hypothesis 3 predicts. We will 
revisit these contrasting logics with the OLS regression results for hypothesis 3. 
 
Chart 2.1 PS premium over CS - Average of 5 selected convertible preferred shares and 
Daesang Preferred Share 3 
Chart 3.1 presents the convertible preferred share premium over the common share (PS Premium over CS) for 5 
selected convertible preferred shares with the same cohort and 10-year time to conversion. The straight line is the 
average of the 5 selected convertible preferred shares. The dotted line is the premium of Daesang Preferred Share 3 
(50477J) over Daesang common shares. The quarters lapsed since issued have values from 0 to 40. 
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Hypothesis 4. The preferred share premium is positively related to corporate leverage.  
Emanuel (1983) emphasizes that preferred dividends may be paid in arrears without 
causing default risks. Firms with higher leverage will have weaker capability to pay dividends. 
While major differences between common shares and convertible preferred shares are lack of 
voting rights, convertibility and higher dividends, taking higher level of debt increases the risk of 
default or dividends going into arrears for preferred shareholders. 
However, preferred shares dividends are more secure than common share dividends. First, 
some preferred dividends are cumulative, and all preferred dividends have priority of claims over 
common share dividends. Above all, all types of preferred shares have voting right recovery 
clauses when dividends are paid in arrears. This provides some cushions to cash flows of 
preferred shares, and an increase in the debt to capital ratio will affect common share price 
negatively by a larger degree than it affects preferred share price. This means that the preferred 
share premium should be higher with higher capital structure. Villupuram (2008) supports this 
view by showing that the Credit Default Swap (CDS) spreads do not show negative responses 
after the preferred share issuance and suggests that preferred shares provide some capital 
cushions to the firm’s capital structure (Villupurum, 2008; Heinkel and Zechner, 1990).  
Kallberg et al. (2013) also provide additional evidence suggesting that the equity holders do not 
respond negatively to the issuances of preferred shares. 
As further development of the agency cost theory, Jensen (1986) provides a persuasive 
theory arguing that the leverage increases firm value. His theory unfolds in two ways; 1) debt 
creation restrains firm managers by bonding them to pay out future cash flows, and 2) debt 
created during a hostile takeover effectively disciplines firm managers resulting into 
restructurings which are beneficial to firm values. We conjecture a similar result for the relation 
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between the leverage and the preferred share premium. We will examine Jensen’s theory with 
hypothesis 4. 
Hypothesis 5. The convertible preferred shares premium is negatively related to the market’s 
general yield spread between AA- corporate bonds and treasury bonds.  
The three-year yield spread is designed to measure the price of default risk in the market, 
which affects bond valuation. The increased default risks in the market leads into reduced 
capability for dividend payment. Delayed dividend payment to common shareholders will 
increase the dividend merit of the preferred shares and will be associated with the more premium 
of convertible preferred shares over common shares. The same effect will happen if the capacity 
to pay preferred dividends deteriorates because in this case the payment of common dividends 
will be worse by a bigger magnitude. 
Hypothesis 6.  The premium of convertible preferred shares over common shares is negatively 
related to market movements and sentiments (during up-markets the premium 
narrows while during down-markets the premium widens).  
In an up market, investors are more focused on capital gains rather than dividend income. 
In a down market, investors seek income cushions rather than capital gain. Unlike North 
America, Korea’s tax regime does not have capital gain tax while dividend income is taxed. This 
makes investing into a common share rather than a convertible preferred share a superior strategy 
in an up-market. Also, as common shares are often more liquid than convertible preferred shares, 
they have advantages in the up market. 
Control variables 
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In addition to the variables related to the hypotheses, we include nine control variables in 
our regression equations: long-term growth, beta, liquidity, share buyback, interest rate 
environment and size. This would allow us to see a clearer relationship between the 6 main 
hypothesis variables and the convertible preferred shares premium. We use the trailing 5-year 
revenue growth to capture long-term growth. We calculate the 30-day beta of preferred shares to 
measure beta. We also introduced the relative liquidity ratio to measure liquidity of preferred 
shares relative to common shares. To control firm size, we used the natural logarithm of total 
assets (Shyu, 2013). Especially, the size variable will control far well-known issues such as 1) 
dividends are increasingly concentrated in a few large players (DeAngelo et al., 2006) and 2) due 
to public scrutiny, larger firms are faced with less agency costs (Shyu, 2013). To control the 
negative relation between the common share buyback and the preferred share premium, we 
added a dummy variable for the common share buyback (Dann, 1981). 
Several control variables are used to capture year effects and the impact of macro shocks. 
Crisis are defined as any consecutive quarter returns of less than -5% market downturn. This 
effectively controls shocks from the crises including the 1998 Asian Financial Crisis (from the 
third quarter of 1999 to the fourth quarter of 2000), the 2003 Credit Card Crisis in Korea (from 
the second quarter of 2002 to the first quarter of 2003), and the 2008 Subprime Mortgage Crisis 
(from the first quarter of 2008 to the fourth quarter of 2008). During the crises, firms’ cash flows 
are largely minimized while corporate governance factors remain intact. We used three time 
dummy variables to control the three crises in Korea. 
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CHAPTER IV. DATA AND MODELS 
Previous literatures on the pricing divergence between the two similar assets often define 
the common share premium as Premium CS-PS = (Price CS – Price PS)/ Price PS in line with 
approaches by Zingales (1994), Fatemi and Krahnen (2000) and Levy (1982). We expect the 
theoretical price of convertible preferred shares should be higher than the common shares 
focusing on higher dividend yield, dividend guarantee structure and convertibility, while voting 
rights may not be significant. In other words, this thesis differs from previous studies by not only 
focusing on voting rights but also other fundamental factors such as dividends and convertibility. 
We therefore set the convertible preferred shares premium as the dependent variable. The 
following is an equation that explains the convertible preferred shares premium: 
Equation 2.1 
Premium PS-CS = (Price PS - Price CS)/ Price CS  
Unlike Fatemi and Krahnen (2000) and Zingales (1994), we do not subtract the dividend 
yield from the price premium. We take this approach to see the impact of the dividend yield 
differentials on the price premium. Instead, we conduct additional regression using quarterly 
dividend yield of preferred shares (QDYP) as a dependent variable to cross check whether there 
are statistically significant relations between the QDYP and independent variables other than 
dividend yield gaps. 
As some researchers attempted, we have broken down the relative premium of 
convertible preferred shares into values of voting rights, convertibility, conversion delay option 
and dividend yield guarantee (Emanuel, 1983). In our equation, all of the values except 
conversion delay option have positive signs, while the values of voting rights and convertibility 
are discounted by the time remaining to conversion. We subtract the conversion delay option 
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from the value of convertibility as the conversion delay option is valuable to the issuers rather 
than holders. Because the values of voting rights, the convertibility and the dividend yield 
guarantee are invisible, we indirectly use the convertible preferred share premium to measure 
them (Nenova, 2003). The following is an equation to conceptualize the convertible preferred 
shares premium in the three theoretic components: 
Equation 4.2 
Premium PS-CS = f (dividend yield differential, voting rights, convertibility, conversion 
delay option, dividend guarantees, other factors) 
 
Data 
Using Thomson Reuters Datastream, we acquired a complete list of 278 preferred share 
issues that are traded on the Korean market between 1998 and 2016. However, due to missing 
data we dropped 182 issues. The remaining sample contains 96 preferred shares, which have 
identifiable stock codes and matching common shares. We excluded preferred shares issued by 
financial companies given different accounting, fiscal years, and financial structures and unique 
capital adequacy regulations (Frischmann, 1999; Callahan et al., 2001; Lemmon and Lins, 2003; 
Howe and Lee, 2006; Royal Bank of Canada, 2008; Bjuggren et al., 2007; Kallberg et al., 2013). 
Furthermore, financial institutions have used preferred shares issuance as part of financial 
restructurings, which is beyond this thesis’s focus (Houston and Houston, 1990). To avoid 
overlapping, we excluded an ETF preferred share, Mirae Asset Tiger Preferred Stock ETF 
(KO:PTM). 
Some researchers believe that preferred shares with premiums over common shares are 
outliers and exclude the preferred shares with premiums from their samples (Chay and Moon, 
2005; Han, 2010; Jeong and Lee, 2013; Yun and Kim, 2016). However, we do not believe that 
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preferred shares with the premium over common shares are outliers. Han (2010) finds that 20% 
of his preferred shares samples show the preferred shares premium. Although voting rights have 
significant values in Korea, we believe there are values for dividend guarantees and 
convertibility which are unique to convertible preferred shares. In this thesis, we do not exclude 
the preferred shares with premiums over the common shares. Instead of removing all of the 
preferred shares trading in premium, we addressed outliers in the following manner. 
To address outliers, we excluded 2 preferred shares with as we discovered data errors 
resulting from mishandling of stock splits and removed 11 preferred shares which have 
undergone major corporate restructurings. During major corporate restructurings, given their 
seniority to common shares, the prices of preferred shares remain intact while their common 
shares counterparts become worthless due to debt-to-equity swaps and/or capital reductions. 
These extraordinary situations lead into extremely high convertible preferred share premiums for 
these preferred shares. Also, to avoid data distortion due to the stale price of preferred shares, we 
have eliminated data points when preferred shares are not traded in the market. Some illiquid 
preferred shares have periods of non-trading, while their common shares continue trading. The 
non-synchronous trading often results in erroneous convertible preferred share premiums. 
As presented in Table 4.1, after the data cleaning process, our data sample contains 83 
preferred shares. Of the 83 preferred shares, we have 59 old preferred shares, 8 new non-
convertible preferred shares and 16 new convertible preferred shares. Of the 83 preferred shares 
samples, there are 13 cumulative preferred shares in total; 7 in convertible preferred shares, 1 in 
new non-convertible preferred shares and 5 in old preferred shares. Compared with new non-
convertible preferred shares and old preferred shares, new convertible preferred shares are more 
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likely to have cumulative dividends. The dividend cumulativeness seems to complement the 
lower dividend yields of new convertible preferred shares. 
Table 4.1 Distribution of sample preferred shares 
 
To avoid survival bias, we included all of 16 convertible preferred shares until they are 
converted to common shares. The percentage of block holding shares is used as a proxy for the 
largest shareholder’s control of firms (Chay and Moon, 2005; Shyu, 2013). We acquired details 
of block shareholding data and conversion schemes from quarterly filings of Korea public 
disclosure. After the 1998 Asian Financial Crisis, Korean public filings started including detailed 
information about shareholding structures and capital policy. The public filings disclose the 
shares of block shareholders aggregating the shares of largest shareholders and affiliated 
parties.10 This allows us to use panel data from 1998 to 2016 for 19 years. The 19 years of time 
periods are long enough to observe all of the recent financial crises; the 1998 Asian Financial 
Crisis, the 2003 Credit Card Crisis in Korea and the 2008 Subprime Mortgage Crisis. Crises 
provide exogenous shocks to our data samples and allow us to more clearly observe fundamental 
changes (Lemmon and Lins, 2003). Ilina et al. (2014) argue that during the crises cash flows 
diminish while the values of controls remain intact. This allows us to clearly observe 
components of the convertible share premium. 
                                                           
10 See dart.fss.or.kr (Quarterly filing → VII. Shareholders → 1. Largest shareholder and specially related persons) 
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Since we can capture significant changes in most variables on a quarterly basis, we have 
modified all variables to quarterly data. As seen in Appendix A, we have daily data available for 
preferred share premium (prem), beta (beta), relative liquidity (liq), market yield spread (yld) and 
market return (mkt). Except market return (mkt), we calculated daily ratios and then averaged 
them to produce quarterly data. For market return (mkt), we calculated quarterly average levels 
of market index and calculated their quarterly returns. For share buyback (dsbb), we calculated 
quarterly changes in shares outstanding and identified share buyback with reduced shares 
outstanding. We have annual data for dividend yield gap (dyg), long-term growth (grth) and 
leverage (lvrg) as they are from financial statements. For the dividend yield gap, we applied year 
end dividends to corresponding years’ interim quarters. And then we calculated daily dividend 
yield gaps and averaged them to produce quarterly data. For long-term growth, we have 
calculated 5-year trailing compound annual growth rate of total sales. For leverage, we acquired 
annual debt-to-capital ratio from Datastream and used them for interim quarters. 
Models 
We have two models for OLS regressions: Model 1 with the preferred share premium as 
a dependent variable and Model 2 with the QDYP as a dependent variable. In addition to the 
main model 1 which measures the valuation of the convertible preferred share premium, we 
attempt to measure the costs of equities and introduce quarterly dividend yield of preferred 
shares (QDYP) and quarterly dividend yield of common shares (QDYC) as seen in Equations 4.3 
and 4.4. Since the QDYP has endogeneity with the dividend yield gap, we replaced it with the 
QDYC. 
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Equation 4.3 
QDYP = PS dividend at year end/ average PS price over a quarter  
Equation 4.4   
QDYC = CS dividend at year end/ average CS price over a quarter  
For each dividend payment, we have chosen the quarters to span the dividend payment date. 
Since most payment dates of Korean firms are in April, we used this dividend to calculate the 
QDYP and QDYC for quarter 4 of the previous year and quarters 1, 2 and 3 of the current year. 
We run two OLS regressions on the dependent variable Premium PS-CS and QDYP using 6 
independent variables and 9 control variables. In our panel data, we controlled firm fixed effects 
and also considered the time effects using three time dummy variables of crises. 
In Model 1, we have set preferred share premium as a dependent variable for three 
different preferred shares groups. Equation 8 is designed to analyze the determinants of the 
convertible preferred share premium. We modify equation 8 to analyze new non-convertible 
preferred shares and old non-convertible preferred shares. Therefore, we drop time to conversion 
(ttc) variable for the two non-convertible preferred shares as they do not have convertibility. 
Equation 4.5 
Convertible Preferred 
Shares Premium PS-CS  
= 
c + X1∙Yield Gap PS-CS + X2∙Growth 5yr rev + X3∙Beta 30-D PS beta + 
X4∙Liquidity rel liq + X5∙Size lnTotal Asset + X6∙Block Holding + 
X7∙Share Buyback + X8∙Leverage + X9∙Time to conversion + 
X10∙Rate Environment DRATE + X11∙Market Yield 3yr CB-Trs + 
X12∙Market index + X13∙Crisis DAFC + X14∙Crisis DCCC 
+ X15∙Crisis DSMC + X16∙CML DCML + 𝜖 
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In Model 2, we have set the quarterly dividend yield of preferred Shares (QDYP) as a 
dependent variable and replaced the dividend yield gap with the quarterly dividend yield of 
common shares (QDYC). Model 2 conjectures that the dividend yield of the common share is an 
important independent variable for the dividend yield of the preferred share. Equation 4.6 
presents Model 2 for convertible preferred shares QDYP. As done in Model 1, we modify 
Equation 4.6 to analyze new non-convertible preferred shares and old non-convertible preferred 
shares dropping time to conversion variable given their lack of convertibility. 
Equation 4.6 
Convertible Preferred 
Shares QDYP PS 
= 
c + X1∙QDYC CS + X2∙Growth 5yr rev + X3∙Beta 30-D beta + 
X4∙Liquidity rel liq + X5∙Size lnTotal Asset + X6∙Block Holding + 
X7∙Share Buyback + X8∙Leverage + X9∙Time to conversion + 
X10∙Rate Environment DRATE + X11∙Market Yield3yr CB-Trs + 
X12∙Marketindex + X13∙Crisis DAFC + X14∙CrisisDCCC + 
X15∙CrisisDSMC + X16∙CMLDCML + 𝜖 
 
(H1) Dividend Yield Gap: To measure relative dividend merits of the preferred shares 
over the common shares, we calculated dividend yield gap, and the following equation explains 
the dividend yield gap: 
Equation 4.7 
Dividend yield gap = DPS PS/ Price PS – DPS CS/ Price CS  
Sureth (2012) suggests that large insider ownership leads into higher dividend payout as 
far as concerned with corporate governance. We control this by using dividend yield gap ratio 
rather than dividend per share itself. On average, dividend yield gaps are positive as the dividend 
yields for the preferred shares tend to be higher than ones for the common shares (Stickle, 1991). 
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In Korean market, dividends are often paid on an annual basis. Assuming dividends are expected 
for 1 year forward, we use year-end dividends for interim quarters. We calculated daily dividend 
yield gaps and averaged them over a quarterly basis. 
(H1-C1) Growth: We calculated firms’ long-term growth using the trailing 5-year 
compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of sales. We used sales as they are more stable and are 
relatively free from accounting differences. To capture the true long-term growth characteristics 
and to avoid lagging effects, we used the trailing 5-year sales growth rate. This will control 
whether dividend yield gaps reflect growth characteristics. La Porta et al. (2000) argue that high 
growth firms pay lower dividends while low growth firms make high dividends. 
(H1-C2) Beta: We introduced beta to control whether the dividend yield gaps reflect risk 
premium of the preferred shares. We calculated the 30-day trailing beta of preferred shares using 
following formula: 
Equation 4.8 
30-D Preferred share  
beta = 
30-D Covariance (Price PS % daily change, Index KOSPI % daily 
change)/ 30-D Variance (Index KOSPI % daily change) 
 
 (H1-C3) Liquidity: Amihud (2002) suggests that illiquid stocks have illiquid premium. 
Previous illiquidity measures such as the bid-ask spread (Amihud and Mendelson, 1988) and the 
daily ratio of absolute stock return to its dollar volume (Amihud 2002) are not applicable to our 
study given limited data availability. To control the illiquidity premium, we instead calculated 
our own measure of the relative liquidity of preferred shares. We calculated liquidity of the 
preferred shares relative to the liquidity of common shares as follows: 
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Equation 4.9 
Relative liquidity = LCS (liquidity of CS = volume of CS / total CS outstanding) 
LPS (liquidity of PS = volume of PS / total PS outstanding) 
The ratio RL (relative liquidity) = LPS/LCS 
 
(H1-C4) Size: Given the fact that preferred shares are often issued by large 
conglomerates in Korea, we added a size variable to capture the size effect. We measure the size 
with natural log of total assets (Shyu, 2013). Since the total assets are financial statement data, 
we used year-end data for interim quarters. 
(H2) Block holding: Block holding variable means percentage ownership of the largest 
controlling group. Korea public filing system, DART11 requires public firms to disclose block 
holding structures of largest shareholders including individuals and institutions. Korean block 
holders consist not only of individuals but also of corporates, not-for-profit institutions and 
financial institutions (Claessens et al., 2000). The DART provides full detail quarterly data of 
block holders from the first quarter of 2000. Compared with other countries, controlling block 
holders of Korean companies tend to have smaller percentages of ownership for example 20-30% 
but effectively control the firms with cross shareholding of the small stakes at the firms 
(Claessens et al., 2000). This makes difficult for us to determine the thresholds for control such 
as 33% or 50%. Therefore, we do not use a dummy variable with the control threshold, rather use 
a continuous variable. 
(H2-C1) Share buyback: Share buyback variable controls the potential negative relation 
between the common share buyback and the preferred share premium. Dann (1981) identifies the 
significant relations between the common share buyback and related bonds and preferred shares. 
                                                           
11 Data Analysis, Retrieval and Transfer 
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This is also related to the supply side theory of Zingales (1994). Reduced supply of the common 
shares due to share buyback may lead into more intense competition for controlling firms. We 
added a dummy variable for the share buyback. 
(H3) Time to conversion: We used time to conversion to measure the time varying value 
of convertibility. Convertible preferred shares have pre-determined conversion dates such as 3, 5, 
and 10 years. We calculate time to conversion with the following equation. 
Equation 4.10 
Time to conversion = -10 + lapsed number of quarters × 0.25  
For instance, time to conversion data should range from -10 to 0.  
However, when dividends are paid in arrear, the conversion is also delayed. Some low 
quality and leveraged companies have large positive maturities like +8. This also causes 
heteroscedasticity as the excessive conversion delay costs lower the convertible preferred share 
premium with extended time to conversion. Yet, this problem was effectively handled when we 
removed 11 preferred shares outliers with major corporate restructurings. During the 
restructuring, common shares lose much of its values by restructuring measures such as debt-to-
equity swap or capital reduction. On the other hand, preferred shares are left intact given its lack 
of voting rights and seniority to common shares. This extraordinary case makes the value of 
preferred shares remaining untouched while having the common shares values almost worthless. 
It inflates the convertible preferred share premium over the common shares to extremely high 
numbers. 
(H4) Leverage: We used debt-to-capital ratio rather than debt-to-equity ratio to measure 
firm leverage. The more inclusive denominator effectively addresses firm leverage. Since we 
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only have year-end balance sheet data, we used year-end leverage ratio for interim quarters. 
Datastream does not provide calculated debt-to-capital ratio on a quarterly basis. Anyhow, 
leverage ratios for interim quarters are in the middle of estimation adjustment, and thus tend to 
be rather inaccurate. Datastream calculated annual debt-to-capital ratio with the following 
equation: 
Equation 4.11 
Debt-to-capital ratio = (Long Term Debt + Short Term Debt + Current Portion of Long 
Term Debt) / (Total Capital + Short Term Debt + Current Portion 
of Long Term Debt) × 100 
 
 (H5) Market yield spread: We calculated the market yield spread between 3-year AA- 
grade corporate bond yield and 3-year Treasury bond yield. Korea’s central bank of Korea 
provides the daily market corporate bond spread data. We used the 3-year spread to capture the 
mid-term perspective of corporate risk premium, which the market currently perceives. We first 
calculated the market yield spread in daily and then averaged them in quarterly. 
Equation 4.12 
Market Yield Spread = Yield 3 yr AA- corporate bond - Yield 3 yr treasury bond  
(H5-C1) Interest rate environment: To control the different interest rate environment over 
the long time-series, we introduced a dummy variable for the interest rate environment. The 
average interest rate for the 3 year corporate bond yields from 1998 to 2016 is 5.18%. We set the 
dummy variable 1 when the quarterly interest rate is above 5.18%, otherwise set it as 0. 
(H6) Market return: We used quarterly returns of Korea stock exchange index KOSPI. 
Using market index KOSPI, we averaged daily index to quarter levels and calculated their 
quarterly returns as follows: 
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Equation 4.13 
Market return = (Quarter average of Index Q1 - Quarter average of Index Q2)/ 
Quarter average of Index Q2 
 
 (Control variable) Crisis: We controlled year effects by including three control dummy 
variables for crises. The crises periods are 1, while non-crises periods are 0. We defined the 
crises period as less than -5% quarter-on-quarter market downturns. This effectively covers the 
1998 Asian financial Crisis, the 2002 Credit Card Crisis in Korea and the 2008 Subprime 
Mortgage Crisis.  
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CHAPTER V. RESULTS 
Descriptive statistics 
As seen in Table 5.1 summary statistics, we found in Korea the preferred share premium 
over the common shares is -18% on average and -41% on median. A probable reason for the 
negative premium is that Korean tax regime does not impose taxes on capital gains while 
dividend incomes are taxed. Amoako-adu et al. (1992) find abnormal returns before rescindment 
of capital gain tax exemptions in Canadian market12 and conclude the capital gains tax exerted 
significant influence on the stock market. In our sample, preferred shares on median pay 0.95% 
higher dividend yield than common shares, while having lower liquidity ratio of 0.80 on 
median.13 Assuming that more liquid stocks are better positioned in capital gains potential, the 
0.95% higher dividend yield advantage was mostly offset by the income tax. As of 2017, Korean 
dividend income tax has an effective rate 15.4%14. This may coincide with some portion of the 
18% discount of the preferred shares against the common shares. Rosenthal and Young (1990) 
find a similar phenomenon that the mispricing between Royal Dutch and Shell was due to the tax 
scheme difference between the U.K. and the Netherlands. 
Table 5.1 Summary statistics – Premium as a dependent variable 
Table 5.1 presents sample statistics for the principle variables for the preferred share premium regressions. We 
grouped preferred shares into four groups. Panel A shows all preferred shares. Panel B shows new convertible 
preferred shares. Panel C shows new non-convertible preferred shares. Panel D shows old non-convertible preferred 
shares. The dependent variable for Model 1 is the preferred share premium over common shares (prem). The 
dependent variable for Model 2 is the quarterly dividend yield of preferred shares (qdyp). The two models have 
following dependent variables; dividend yield gap between preferred shares and common shares (dyg), quarterly 
dividend yield of common shares (qdyc), 5 year trailing revenue compound growth rate (grth), beta of preferred 
                                                           
12 In May 1985, Canadian government introduced capital gain exemption of $500,000. After two years of the capital 
gain exemption in June 1987, the exemption limit was reduced to $100,000, making the tax saving ineffective. 
13 In Korea, dividend yields for preferred shares are not as great as North America. In North America, preferred 
shares dividend yields are more than twice of common shares (Stickle, 1991). 
14 An exact formula is dividend income × (Income tax 14% + Residence tax 1.4%). This is applicable up to 
KRW20mn (C$22,000) dividend income bracket. If the dividend income is greater than KRW20mn, a higher tax 
rate of 25% is imposed. 
 43 
 
shares measured in 30 day beta of the preferred shares (beta), relative liquidity of the preferred shares compared to 
common shares (liq), firm size measured in log of total assets (size), block holding shares (block), leverage 
measured in debt-to-capital (lvrg), time to conversion (ttc), market yield spread measures in the spread between 3 
year AA- corporate bond yields and 3 year treasury bond yields (yld) and market return measured in Korean index 
KOSPI’s quarterly return (mkt). Time to conversion is only relevant to new convertible preferred shares. 
  Mean SD 5th pctl. 25th pctl. Median 75th pctl. 95th pctl. Obs. 
 A. All preferred shares 
 prem -0.1801 1.0798 -0.6979 -0.5539 -0.4130 -0.2010 0.7486 4,884 
dyg 0.0131 0.0228 -0.0078 0.0000 0.0095 0.0222 0.0483 4,884 
qdrp 0.0314 0.0335 0.0000 0.0052 0.0237 0.0468 0.0915 4,746 
qdrc 0.0177 0.0210 0.0000 0.0030 0.0122 0.0243 0.0567 4,784 
grth 0.0797 0.1333 -0.1014 0.0090 0.0766 0.1356 0.2814 4,330 
beta 0.5087 0.4559 -0.1420 0.2162 0.4721 0.7746 1.2735 4,854 
liq 3.6038 15.2257 0.0998 0.3653 0.8066 2.0708 13.2992 4,884 
size 9.3158 0.8104 8.0645 8.7213 9.2396 9.8375 10.8112 4,856 
block 0.3962 0.1659 0.1584 0.2615 0.3746 0.4940 0.7147 4,810 
lvrg 0.4259 0.2413 0.0138 0.2666 0.4586 0.5784 0.7429 4,821 
yld 0.0081 0.0056 0.0029 0.0042 0.0069 0.0101 0.0147 5,470 
mkt 0.0320 0.1142 -0.1533 -0.0310 0.0233 0.0752 0.3053 5,470 
B. New convertible preferred shares 
 prem 0.8976 2.2234 -0.3948 -0.1928 -0.0412 0.5949 6.6294 476 
dyg -0.0011 0.0196 -0.0337 -0.0005 0.0001 0.0056 0.0186 476 
qdrp 0.0186 0.0270 0.0000 0.0000 0.0100 0.0289 0.0579 470 
qdrc 0.0163 0.0181 0.0000 0.0000 0.0118 0.0248 0.0513 508 
grth 0.0667 0.1250 -0.1374 -0.0013 0.0830 0.1370 0.2633 403 
beta 0.3583 0.4559 -0.3455 0.1097 0.3510 0.6115 1.1149 463 
liq 5.1099 25.9822 0.0511 0.2310 0.7277 2.2442 17.3579 476 
size 8.9726 0.6203 7.9706 8.4222 9.0445 9.3540 9.9668 475 
block 0.4691 0.1509 0.2566 0.3731 0.4466 0.5821 0.7257 464 
ttc -3.9633 3.0636 -9.2500 -6.2500 -3.5000 -1.5000 0.2500 457 
lvrg 0.4171 0.1932 0.0707 0.2440 0.4622 0.5497 0.6694 474 
yld 0.0088 0.0059 0.0033 0.0044 0.0080 0.0111 0.0147 590 
mkt 0.0314 0.1200 -0.1590 -0.0328 0.0249 0.0877 0.3053 590 
C. New non-convertible preferred 
shares 
 prem -0.0904 1.7142 -0.6989 -0.5843 -0.4326 -0.3159 0.8288 491 
dyg 0.0157 0.0205 -0.0076 0.0000 0.0154 0.0247 0.0489 491 
qdrp 0.0368 0.0288 0.0000 0.0145 0.0349 0.0546 0.0871 475 
qdrc 0.0205 0.0139 0.0000 0.0090 0.0197 0.0286 0.0469 475 
grth 0.0929 0.1418 -0.1904 0.0062 0.0841 0.1723 0.3361 457 
beta 0.4782 0.4987 -0.2226 0.1696 0.4570 0.8060 1.2466 485 
liq 2.1364 5.7929 0.0512 0.3855 0.7963 1.7130 6.9603 491 
size 9.8009 0.9251 8.5900 8.8234 9.8075 10.5881 11.1661 497 
block 0.3910 0.1434 0.1911 0.2597 0.4033 0.4741 0.6240 485 
lvrg 0.4315 0.2197 0.0135 0.2846 0.4945 0.5811 0.6999 493 
yld 0.0078 0.0055 0.0029 0.0042 0.0065 0.0099 0.0146 535 
mkt 0.0282 0.1084 -0.1533 -0.0310 0.0231 0.0700 0.2280 535 
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D. Old preferred shares 
prem -0.3223 0.5694 -0.7066 -0.5656 -0.4446 -0.2576 0.3943 3,917 
dyg 0.0145 0.0229 -0.0017 0.0017 0.0107 0.0233 0.0500 3,917 
qdrp 0.0323 0.0344 0.0000 0.0056 0.0245 0.0476 0.0951 3,801 
qdrc 0.0176 0.0220 0.0000 0.0028 0.0113 0.0232 0.0595 3,801 
grth 0.0795 0.1330 -0.0927 0.0104 0.0736 0.1323 0.2729 3,470 
beta 0.5304 0.4467 -0.0966 0.2338 0.4894 0.7930 1.2878 3,906 
liq 3.6048 14.2281 0.1255 0.3880 0.8178 2.1018 13.4622 3,917 
size 9.2957 0.7874 8.0597 8.7212 9.2552 9.8222 10.6643 3,884 
block 0.3881 0.1681 0.1562 0.2597 0.3604 0.4930 0.7243 3,861 
lvrg 0.4263 0.2492 0.0118 0.2666 0.4508 0.5791 0.7710 3,854 
yld 0.0080 0.0056 0.0029 0.0042 0.0069 0.0101 0.0147 4,345 
mkt 0.0325 0.1142 -0.1533 -0.0310 0.0233 0.0752 0.3053 4,345 
 
On average, both the old non-convertible preferred shares and the new non-convertible 
preferred shares have negative premiums of -9% and -32%, respectively. However, when we 
look only at the convertible preferred shares, the convertible preferred share premium is 
surprisingly at a positive level of 89%. This is in line with our original expectation when we 
introduced the convertible preferred share premium with Equation 4. Zingales (1994) also finds a 
similar phenomenon where convertible non-voting shares generally sell premiums with respect 
to voting shares in Italy. Lease et al. (1983) find that some dual-class shares have shown positive 
premium when the dual-class shares included voting preferred shares. In median, the premium is 
relatively high at -4% for convertible preferred shares, while the premiums both for new non-
convertible preferred shares and old non-convertible preferred shares remain low at -43% and -
44%, respectively. The two non-convertible preferred shares show similar discount levels in 
previous studies in Korea (Chay and Moon, 2005; Han, 2010). However, this thesis provides new 
evidence that the convertible preferred shares have higher premium than non-convertible 
preferred shares. This suggests there are significant values for the convertibility and the dividend 
guarantees, as we conceptualize before in Equation 4.2. 
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Assuming the degree of yield guarantees among the three types of the preferred shares is 
similar without much difference,15 the old non-convertible preferred shares and the new non-
convertible preferred shares differ from the new convertible preferred shares in terms of 
convertibility and voting rights. Based on naïve estimation, this means that corporate governance 
related values like convertibility and voting rights are estimated more than 40% on median. 
These significant values for the voting rights and convertibility are not unusual in other markets 
(Lease et al., 1983; Ilina et al., 2014). Equations 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3 explain the value of voting right 
and dividend guarantees using differences between common shares, convertible preferred shares 
and non-convertible preferred shares. 
In addition to the corporate governance values, dividend cumulativeness is also a very 
important factor for the valuation of the preferred shares. As explained in Equation 5.1, assuming 
all else equal, the only difference between value of common shares and value of non-convertible 
preferred shares is value of voting right V(VR). Again, assuming all else equal, the difference 
(Equation 5.2) between value of common shares and value of convertible preferred shares is 
V(VR) minus value of dividend cumulativeness V(CMLD). If we subtract Equation 5.2 from 
Equation 5.1, we get value of dividend cumulativeness V(CMLD) in Equation 5.3, which is the 
difference between value of convertible preferred shares and value of non-convertible preferred 
shares. As explained in Table 5.1, we calculated the premiums of convertible preferred shares 
and non-convertible preferred shares as -4% and -43% on median, respectively. We know that 
the value of voting right V(VR) is 43% according to Equation 5.1 and the value of dividend 
cumulativeness V(CML) is -4% - (-43%) = 39%. 
 
                                                           
15 While we have seen majority of convertible preferred shares are cumulative, other types are mostly non-
cumulative. This would make the convertible preferred shares even more valuable. 
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Equation 5.1 
V(VR) = Value of common shares – Value of non-convertible preferred shares  
Equation 5.2   
V(VR) – V(CMLD) = Value of common shares – Value of convertible preferred shares  
Equation 5.3   
V(CMLD) = Value of convertible preferred shares – Value of non-convertible 
preferred shares 
 
Table 5.1 Summary statistics – Premium as a dependent variable 
Table 5.1 presents sample statistics for the principle variables for the preferred share premium regressions. We 
grouped preferred shares into four groups. Panel A shows all preferred shares. Panel B shows new convertible 
preferred shares. Panel C shows new non-convertible preferred shares. Panel D shows old non-convertible preferred 
shares. The dependent variable for Model 1 is the preferred share premium over common shares (prem). The 
dependent variable for Model 2 is the quarterly dividend yield of preferred shares (qdyp). The two models have 
following dependent variables; dividend yield gap between preferred shares and common shares (dyg), quarterly 
dividend yield of common shares (qdyc), 5 year trailing revenue compound growth rate (grth), beta of preferred 
shares measured in 30 day beta of the preferred shares (beta), relative liquidity of the preferred shares compared to 
common shares (liq), firm size measured in log of total assets (size), block holding shares (block), leverage 
measured in debt-to-capital (lvrg), time to conversion (ttc), market yield spread measures in the spread between 3 
year AA- corporate bond yields and 3 year treasury bond yields (yld) and market return measured in Korean index 
KOSPI’s quarterly return (mkt). Time to conversion is only relevant to new convertible preferred shares. 
  Mean SD 5th pctl. 25th pctl. Median 75th pctl. 95th pctl. Obs. 
 A. All preferred shares 
 prem -0.1801 1.0798 -0.6979 -0.5539 -0.4130 -0.2010 0.7486 4,884 
dyg 0.0131 0.0228 -0.0078 0.0000 0.0095 0.0222 0.0483 4,884 
qdrp 0.0314 0.0335 0.0000 0.0052 0.0237 0.0468 0.0915 4,746 
qdrc 0.0177 0.0210 0.0000 0.0030 0.0122 0.0243 0.0567 4,784 
grth 0.0797 0.1333 -0.1014 0.0090 0.0766 0.1356 0.2814 4,330 
beta 0.5087 0.4559 -0.1420 0.2162 0.4721 0.7746 1.2735 4,854 
liq 3.6038 15.2257 0.0998 0.3653 0.8066 2.0708 13.2992 4,884 
size 9.3158 0.8104 8.0645 8.7213 9.2396 9.8375 10.8112 4,856 
block 0.3962 0.1659 0.1584 0.2615 0.3746 0.4940 0.7147 4,810 
lvrg 0.4259 0.2413 0.0138 0.2666 0.4586 0.5784 0.7429 4,821 
yld 0.0081 0.0056 0.0029 0.0042 0.0069 0.0101 0.0147 5,470 
mkt 0.0320 0.1142 -0.1533 -0.0310 0.0233 0.0752 0.3053 5,470 
B. New convertible preferred shares 
 prem 0.8976 2.2234 -0.3948 -0.1928 -0.0412 0.5949 6.6294 476 
dyg -0.0011 0.0196 -0.0337 -0.0005 0.0001 0.0056 0.0186 476 
qdrp 0.0186 0.0270 0.0000 0.0000 0.0100 0.0289 0.0579 470 
qdrc 0.0163 0.0181 0.0000 0.0000 0.0118 0.0248 0.0513 508 
grth 0.0667 0.1250 -0.1374 -0.0013 0.0830 0.1370 0.2633 403 
beta 0.3583 0.4559 -0.3455 0.1097 0.3510 0.6115 1.1149 463 
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liq 5.1099 25.9822 0.0511 0.2310 0.7277 2.2442 17.3579 476 
size 8.9726 0.6203 7.9706 8.4222 9.0445 9.3540 9.9668 475 
block 0.4691 0.1509 0.2566 0.3731 0.4466 0.5821 0.7257 464 
ttc -3.9633 3.0636 -9.2500 -6.2500 -3.5000 -1.5000 0.2500 457 
lvrg 0.4171 0.1932 0.0707 0.2440 0.4622 0.5497 0.6694 474 
yld 0.0088 0.0059 0.0033 0.0044 0.0080 0.0111 0.0147 590 
mkt 0.0314 0.1200 -0.1590 -0.0328 0.0249 0.0877 0.3053 590 
C. New non-convertible preferred 
shares 
 prem -0.0904 1.7142 -0.6989 -0.5843 -0.4326 -0.3159 0.8288 491 
dyg 0.0157 0.0205 -0.0076 0.0000 0.0154 0.0247 0.0489 491 
qdrp 0.0368 0.0288 0.0000 0.0145 0.0349 0.0546 0.0871 475 
qdrc 0.0205 0.0139 0.0000 0.0090 0.0197 0.0286 0.0469 475 
grth 0.0929 0.1418 -0.1904 0.0062 0.0841 0.1723 0.3361 457 
beta 0.4782 0.4987 -0.2226 0.1696 0.4570 0.8060 1.2466 485 
liq 2.1364 5.7929 0.0512 0.3855 0.7963 1.7130 6.9603 491 
size 9.8009 0.9251 8.5900 8.8234 9.8075 10.5881 11.1661 497 
block 0.3910 0.1434 0.1911 0.2597 0.4033 0.4741 0.6240 485 
lvrg 0.4315 0.2197 0.0135 0.2846 0.4945 0.5811 0.6999 493 
yld 0.0078 0.0055 0.0029 0.0042 0.0065 0.0099 0.0146 535 
mkt 0.0282 0.1084 -0.1533 -0.0310 0.0231 0.0700 0.2280 535 
D. Old preferred shares 
 prem -0.3223 0.5694 -0.7066 -0.5656 -0.4446 -0.2576 0.3943 3,917 
dyg 0.0145 0.0229 -0.0017 0.0017 0.0107 0.0233 0.0500 3,917 
qdrp 0.0323 0.0344 0.0000 0.0056 0.0245 0.0476 0.0951 3,801 
qdrc 0.0176 0.0220 0.0000 0.0028 0.0113 0.0232 0.0595 3,801 
grth 0.0795 0.1330 -0.0927 0.0104 0.0736 0.1323 0.2729 3,470 
beta 0.5304 0.4467 -0.0966 0.2338 0.4894 0.7930 1.2878 3,906 
liq 3.6048 14.2281 0.1255 0.3880 0.8178 2.1018 13.4622 3,917 
size 9.2957 0.7874 8.0597 8.7212 9.2552 9.8222 10.6643 3,884 
block 0.3881 0.1681 0.1562 0.2597 0.3604 0.4930 0.7243 3,861 
lvrg 0.4263 0.2492 0.0118 0.2666 0.4508 0.5791 0.7710 3,854 
yld 0.0080 0.0056 0.0029 0.0042 0.0069 0.0101 0.0147 4,345 
mkt 0.0325 0.1142 -0.1533 -0.0310 0.0233 0.0752 0.3053 4,345 
 
In our sample, there are significant values for the voting rights and the cumulative 
dividends with opposite signs. Previous literature focus on the value of voting rights, but this 
thesis provides new evidence for the cumulative dividends. This mathematical approach allows 
us to explain the wide gap between the value of convertible preferred shares and non-convertible 
preferred shares. In our regression, we add the cumulative variable, but it has multicollinearity 
problem with other dummy variables. To address the multicollinearity, in Chapter VI Robustness 
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Checks, we will run separate regressions on the sample data grouping them into the two groups; 
the cumulative and the non-cumulative. 
In Charts 3.1, 5.1 and 5.2, we have drawn the convertible preferred shares premium to the 
common shares against the time to conversion. For a fair comparison, we have selected 5 
convertible preferred shares with the same cohort and time to conversion of 10 years. It is 
interesting that the convertible preferred share premium first drops down to a -30-40% level and 
then gradually rises back to a zero level. As presented in Chart 5.1 and Chart 5.2, this interesting 
pattern repeats in individual cases of the 5 selected convertible preferred shares. Unfortunately, 
the current literature does not provide a clear theory about this phenomenon. A possible scenario 
is that the value of the convertibility and voting rights are discounted by time to conversion. As 
the convertible preferred shares are approaching to the conversion time, both the convertibility 
and the voting rights are getting more valuable, pushing the convertible preferred share premium 
away from negative territories. This may explain the positive slope observed from quarter 23 (-5 
years) to quarter 40 (0 years). 
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Chart 3.1 PS premium over CS - Average of 5 selected convertible preferred shares and 
Daesang Preferred Share 3 
Chart 3.1 presents the convertible preferred share premium over the common share (PS Premium over CS) for 5 
selected convertible preferred shares with the same cohort and 10-year time to conversion. The straight line is the 
average of the 5 selected convertible preferred shares. The dotted line is the premium of Daesang Preferred Share 3 
(50477J) over Daesang common shares. The quarters lapsed since issued have values from 0 to 40. 
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Chart 5.1 PS premium over CS - Premium of Farmsco Preferred Share and Daesang 
Preferred Share 2 
Chart 5.1 presents the convertible preferred share premium over the common share (PS Premium over CS) for 5 
selected convertible preferred shares with the same cohort and 10-year time to conversion. The solid line is the 
premium of Farmsco Preferred Share (KO:DSA) over Farmsco common share. The dotted line is the premium of 
Daesang Preferred Shares 2 (KO:DAB) over Daesang common shares. The quarters lapsed since issued have values 
from 0 to 40. 
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Chart 5.2 PS premium over CS - Premium of Sebang Preferred Share 2 and Hyundai Steel 
Preferred Share 
Chart 5.2 presents the convertible preferred share premium over the common share (PS Premium over CS) for 5 
selected convertible preferred shares with the same cohort and 10-year time to conversion. The solid line is the 
premium of Sebang Preferred Share 2 (KO:GBE) over Sebang common share. The dotted line is the premium of 
Hyundai Steel Preferred Share (KO:ICH) over Hyundai Steel common share. The quarters lapsed since issued have 
values from 0 to 40. 
OLS regression results – PS premium as a dependent variable 
As seen in Table 5.2 and 5.3, we tested our six hypotheses using the OLS regression 
method and found that three out of six hypotheses have shown statistically significant 
coefficients within 95% confidence intervals. It is worth to note that the three hypotheses 1 (dyg), 
3 (ttc) and 4 (lvrg) are corporate level related, suggesting strong evidence against the traditional 
Miller-Modigliani and Miller-Scholes irrelevance theories. We believe this study opens many 
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doors for the ongoing corporate finance discussions. Our model on convertible preferred shares 
has shown satisfactory adjusted R-squares of 0.889 and F-statistics of 13.49. This suggests that 
our model successfully explains the variations of the preferred share premium and fits well to the 
data sets. 
Table 5.2 OLS regression results - Premium as a dependent variable 
Table 5.2 presents OLS regression estimates for Model 1 – premium as a dependent variable. The dependent 
variable is the preferred share premium. The independent variables are dividend yield gap between preferred shares 
and common shares (dyg), 5 year trailing revenue compound growth rate (grth), beta of preferred shares measured in 
30 day beta of the preferred shares (beta), relative liquidity of the preferred shares compared to common shares (liq), 
firm size measured in log of total assets (size), block holding shares (block), dummy variable for the share buyback 
(dsbb), time to conversion (ttc), leverage measured in debt-to-capital (lvrg), dummy variable for the rate 
environment (drate), market yield spread measures in the spread between 3 year AA- corporate bond yields and 3 
year treasury bond yields (yld), market return measured in Korean index KOSPI’s quarterly return (mkt), dummy 
variable for the 1998 Asian Financial Crisis (dafc), dummy variable for the 2002 Credit Card Crisis in Korea (dccc) 
and dummy variable for the 2008 Subprime Mortgage Crisis (dsmc). Each column represents regressions for four 
groups: (1) all preferred shares, (2) new convertible preferred shares, (3) new non-convertible preferred shares and 
(4) old preferred shares. It must be noted time to conversion (ttc) is only applicable to regression (2) given its 
convertibility. Given multicollinearity of dividend cumulativeness (dcml), we dropped dcml. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
All New Convertible New Non-Convertible Old Non-Convertible 
VARIABLES prem prem prem prem 
dyg -4.8124*** -11.0384*** -25.4451*** -2.9477*** 
 
(-8.172) (-3.303) (-7.043) (-6.990) 
grth 0.0212 -0.0582 -0.6633 -0.1238* 
 
(0.220) (-0.110) (-0.957) (-1.757) 
beta 0.0032 0.0120 -0.0952 0.0071 
(0.117) (0.115) (-0.637) (0.351) 
liq 0.0047*** 0.0324*** 0.0216 0.0018*** 
 
(5.666) (9.635) (1.400) (3.070) 
size -0.1253** -0.4033 0.4682 -0.1996*** 
 
(-2.047) (-1.139) (1.403) (-4.420) 
block -0.9123*** 0.6081 -9.8743*** -0.2993*** 
(-7.255) (0.818) (-10.413) (-3.413) 
dsbb 0.03 0.0053 0.2780* -0.0409* 
 
-1.021 (0.038) (1.955) (-1.855) 
ttc 0.0945*** 
(4.123) 
 lvrg 0.0737 1.9312*** 2.7443*** -0.1613*** 
(0.873) (4.587) (2.883) (-2.741) 
drate -0.0183 -0.2347* 0.4064** -0.0359 
 
(-0.556) (-1.700) (2.096) (-1.497) 
yld -1.9007 0.6773 9.1105 -3.7710** 
 
(-0.781) (0.075) (0.670) (-2.094) 
mkt -0.5838*** -0.2435 -2.6580*** -0.3872*** 
(-3.933) (-0.419) (-3.154) (-3.560) 
dafc 0.1984*** 0.1686 1.7051*** -0.0068 
 
(2.639) (0.570) (4.151) (-0.122) 
  
dccc 
dsmc 
 Constant 
 Observations 
Firm fixed effects 
F-stat 
Adjusted R-squared 
t-statistics in parentheses 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
Table 5.3 Correlation 
Table 5.3 presents correlation between the principle variables; the
(prem), dividend yield gap between preferred shares and common shares (dyg
shares (qdyp), quarterly dividend yield of common shares (qdyc), 5
preferred shares measured in 30 day b
compared to common shares (liq), firm size measured in log of total assets (size), block holding
dummy variable for share buyback (dsbb), 
dummy variable for the market rate environment (drate), 
AA- corporate bond yields and 3 year tre
quarterly return (mkt), dummy variable for the 1998 Asian Financial Crisis (dafc), dummy variable for the 2002 
Credit Card Crisis (dccc) and dummy variable for the 2008 Subprime Mortga
the 5% significance of the correlations.
Panel A: All preferred shares 
 
 
53 
0.0229 0.1471 0.3160
(0.324) (0.580) (0.808)
-0.1791*** -0.1106 -1.1640***
(-3.081) (-0.521) (-3.448)
1.4062** 3.9824 -1.9543
(2.488) (1.238) (-0.621)
4,182 370 443
Yes Yes 
15.53 13.49 18.29
0.619 0.889 0.532
 preferred share premium over
), quarterly dividend yield of preferred 
-year trailing revenue growth (
eta of the preferred shares (beta), relative liquidity of the preferred shares 
leverage measured in debt-to-capital (lvrg), time to conversion (ttc
market yield spread measures in the spread between 3
asury bond yields (yld), market return measured in Korean index KOSPI’s 
ge Crisis (dsmc). We add * to indicate 
 
 
 
 0.0230 
 (0.438) 
 -0.0726* 
 (-1.695) 
 1.8277*** 
 (4.391) 
 3,351 
Yes Yes 
 12.55 
 0.346 
 common shares 
grth), beta of 
 shares (block), 
), A 
 year 
    
 
  
Panel B: New Convertible preferred shares
Panel C: New Non-Convertible preferred shares
 
In contrast to Hypothesis 1, o
the convertible preferred share premium 
statistically significant within a 99% confidence interval
11.0384 with t-value of -3.303
shares have shown statistically significant coefficients within 99% confidence intervals. 
result seems contradictory to traditional finance th
leads into a higher price of the asset.
Unfortunately, we do not have solid theoretical arguments for 
our best attempt, we can think of two explanations for the result. First, Chay
find that a dummy variable for dividend payment has a negative relation with the preferred share 
premium after the 1998 Asian Financial Crisis. As explained before, the preferred shares have 
voting rights recovery clause when the issuer om
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over the common shares. The regression result is 
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. Furthermore, all of the regressions for each group’s preferred 
eory, where higher cash flow from given asset 
 
this surprising result
its dividends. The recovery of voting rights 
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This 
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 and Moon (2005) 
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significantly raises the preferred share premium. The large negative coefficient of -11.0384 
supports this explanation. This result is consistent in regressions for all other types of preferred 
shares. 
Our reading on the “catering theory” of Baker and Wurgler (2004) suggests another 
explanation. In the framework of the catering theory, the high dividend yield attracts long-term 
investors focusing on income rather than capital gains. They continue to demand higher 
dividends for the preferred shares in compensation for lower price of preferred shares compared 
to common shares. In some countries, preferred shares are mainly traded by financial institutions. 
In Sweden, non-voting shares are mostly owned by pension managers who do not focus on 
capital gains but are concerned with dividend yields (Bjuggren et al., 2007, Allen et al., 2000). 
Preferred shares effectively serve fixed interest investors in Australia, who lack an access to a 
significant corporate bond market (Davis, 1996). Like other international markets, Korean 
financial institutions may be the main clients of the preferred shares given its tax exemption. 
For Hypothesis 2, we have tested whether there are any significant relations between the 
preferred share premiums and the control of firms. The regression does not have significant 
coefficient for the convertible preferred shares. In contrast to the convertible preferred shares, 
other two types of the non-convertible preferred shares have shown significant coefficients. We 
found opposite regression results for the other two types of preferred shares support this scenario.  
In line with previous research Fatemi and Krahen (2000) and Zingales (1994), we have a result 
indicating that the size of the block holding shares is negatively associated (t-values of -10.413 
and -3.413) with the other two types of non-convertible preferred share premium. The result is 
statistically significant within 99% confidence intervals. This means that the relation between the 
ownership and the preferred share premium can be better explained by the supply side 
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competition theory of Zingales (1994) rather than the agency cost theory. Unlike our regression, 
the agency cost theory should have shown a positive coefficient indicating that there are greater 
agency costs with the larger block holding shares. 
We have three explanations about this insignificance for the convertible preferred shares 
and significance for the other two types regarding the block holding variable. First, management 
block holding variable is not significant for the convertible preferred shares probably due to its 
convertibility, which allows them to behave as if they are common shares since issued. Second, 
there may be curvilinear relation between the ownership control and the convertible preferred 
share premium. Several scholars including McConnell and Servaes (1990), Ilina et al. (2014) and 
Seifert et al. (2005) indicate the curvilinear relation between the ownership and variables related 
to firm values. This study’s OLS regression may be incapable to handle the potential curvilinear 
relations. Third, Chay and Moon (2005) also have insignificant coefficients between the 
preferred share premium and the block holders, and they argue that this result is probably due to 
the misalignment between the ownership and the firm control. However, this cannot explain the 
significant coefficients for regressions on the two non-convertible preferred shares. 
Contrary to our expectation in Hypothesis 3, the time to conversion is positively 
associated with the convertible preferred share premium with coefficient of 0.0945 and t-stat 
4.123. The regression is statistically significant within a 99% confidence interval. As seen in 
Chart 1.1 and 1.2, the preferred share premium first declines as the time to conversion decreases. 
And then the premium recovers to zero. This suggests that we have mixed results depending on 
when you start investing into the convertible preferred shares. However, on average, the 
convertible preferred share premium increases with less time remaining to the conversion. It 
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means the convertibility has values to the convertible preferred shareholders and is discounted to 
time. 
 
Chart 1.1 Daesang Preferred share 3 case study: Premium and Ex-dividend dates 
Chart 1.1 presents 3 years of time series data of the convertible preferred share premium of a major Korean food 
manufacturing company Daesang. Along with the time series data, we highlighted ex-dividend dates for the last 
three years until Daesang Preferred Share 3’s conversion in April 2017. We plotted three price information; Daesang 
common share price (C/S), Daesang Preferred Share 3 price (P/S 3) and Daesang Preferred Share 3’s premium over 
the common share (PS Premium-RHS). Prices are in Korean won per share, while the convertible preferred share 
premium is in percentage. 
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Chart 1.2 Hyundai Steel Preferred Share case study: Premium and Ex-dividend dates 
Chart 1.2 presents 3 years of time series data of the convertible preferred share premium of a major cyclical steel 
maker Hyundai Steel. Along with the time series data, we highlighted ex-dividend dates for the last three years until 
Hyundai Steel Preferred Share’s conversion in March 2010. We plotted three price information; Hyundai Steel 
common share price (C/S), Hyundai Steel Preferred Share price (P/S) and Hyundai Steel Preferred Share’s premium 
over the common share (PS Premium-RHS). Prices are in Korean won per share, while the convertible preferred 
share premium is in percentage. 
In line with our expectation in Hypothesis 4, the leverage variable has shown a 
significant coefficient of 1.9312 with t-stat of 4.587 within 99% confidence intervals. Rather 
than weakening debt serviceability, the increased leverage made the convertible preferred shares 
more valuable. The increased leverage made the convertible preferred shares more attractive 
investment as they are not considered debt and have more flexibility in cash outflow. Jen at el. 
(1997) argue that financially distressed firms issue the convertible preferred shares given its less 
financial burden than debts and consequentially lower risk of defaults. As suggested by Fischer 
and Glenn (1968), firms use preferred shares as a substitute for debt financing with a belief of 
“some leverage is better than none.” Jensen (1986) and Barclay and Holderness (1989) create 
theories supporting the positive relation between the asset price and the leverage. Our finding 
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about the positive relation between the leverage and the preferred share premium provides 
additional evidence on these theories. 
On the other hand, it is also probable that the value of the convertible preferred shares 
declined less than the common shares, widening the gap between them. This is seen in the 11 
preferred shares where we removed from our sample because of major financial restructurings. 
Given the seniority to common shares, during the financial restructurings the values of the 
preferred shares remain intact while their common shares became worthless. 
For Hypothesis 5, the market yield spread variable does not have a significant coefficient 
for regression of the convertible preferred shares. The dummy variable for the market interest 
has a weak correlation with the convertible preferred share premium with 90% significance. 
However, it is very interesting that regressions of old preferred shares have shown statistically 
significant results (coefficient -3.7710 and t-stat -2.094). In line with the result of Hypothesis 2, 
the result for Hypothesis 5 supports that the convertible preferred shares are more like equity, 
while the non-convertible preferred shares have strong characteristics of bonds. In other words, 
non-convertible preferred shares respond more sensitively to credit related variables given their 
bondness, while convertible preferred shares remain isolated from the credit side variables. As 
also discussed above, further research on the differences between convertible preferred shares 
and non-convertible preferred shares will be a very interesting research area. 
Regarding to Hypothesis 6, we do not find statistically significant result for the 
convertible preferred shares. However, non-convertible preferred shares and old preferred shares 
have shown statistically significant results with 99% confidence intervals (coefficient -2.6580 
and -0.3872, respectively). This suggests that common shares on average are adept in the up-
market, while the bond-like preferred shares like non-convertible preferred shares and old 
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preferred shares effectively provide cash flow cushions in the down-market. Furthermore, lack of 
liquidity in convertible preferred shares seems to make them less efficient momentum players in 
the up-markets. As seen in Hypothesis 2 and 5, we continue to see the bond-equity dichotomy 
based on convertibility make significant influence on the relation between the preferred share 
premium and independent variables. 
(Control variable) Crisis dummy variables do not have significant regression coefficients. 
Instead, liquidity variable shows significant coefficient of 0.0324 within a 99% confidence 
interval with t-stat of 9.635. This is opposite to the prediction by the illiquidity premium 
argument of Amihud (2002). It means the more liquid the preferred shares the higher premium it 
has over the common shares. As explained before, this is probably due to the capital tax 
exemption in Korean market, where being easy to sell is one of the important trading 
characteristics. 
This is in line with our finding in Hyundai Steel Case study in Chart 1.2. Amihud (2002) 
observed the “flight-to-liquidity” during the October 1987 Crisis, where market participants 
switch from less liquid to more liquid stocks. During the crisis, investors sell the less liquid 
convertible preferred shares and instead buy the more liquid common shares. This provides 
additional evidence to Amihud’s study on the “flight-to-liquidity.” 
 61 
 
 
Chart 1.2 Hyundai Steel Preferred Share case study: Premium and Ex-dividend dates 
Chart 1.2 presents 3 years of time series data of the convertible preferred share premium of a major cyclical steel 
maker Hyundai Steel. Along with the time series data, we highlighted ex-dividend dates for the last three years until 
Hyundai Steel Preferred Share’s conversion in March 2010. We plotted three price information; Hyundai Steel 
common share price (C/S), Hyundai Steel Preferred Share price (P/S) and Hyundai Steel Preferred Share’s premium 
over the common share (PS Premium-RHS). Prices are in Korean won per share, while the convertible preferred 
share premium is in percentage. 
OLS regression results – QDYP as a dependent variable 
As seen in Table 5.4, we run another OLS regression on the quarterly dividend yield of 
preferred Shares (QDYP) as a dependent variable instead of the preferred share premium. As 
defined in Model 2 with Equation 9, we attempt to examine relations between the cost of equities 
and our principle variables. While Model 1 has F-stat of 13.49 and R squared of 0.889, Model 2 
has F-stat of 12.68 and R squared of 0.542. Model 1 seems to be a slightly better model. We run 
regressions with four groups of the preferred shares; (1) all preferred shares, (2) new convertible 
preferred shares, (3) new non-convertible preferred shares and (4) old non-convertible preferred 
shares. 
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Table 5.4 OLS regression results - QDYP as a dependent variable 
Table 5.4 presents OLS regression estimates for Model 2 – QDYP as a dependent variable. The dependent variable 
is quarterly dividend yield of preferred shares (qdyp). The independent variables are quarterly dividend yield of 
common shares (qdyc), 5 year trailing revenue compound growth rate (grth), beta of preferred shares measured in 30 
day beta of the preferred shares (beta), relative liquidity of the preferred shares compared to common shares (liq), 
firm size measured in log of total assets (size), block holding shares (block), dummy variable for share buyback 
(dsbb), leverage measured in debt-to-capital (lvrg), time to conversion (ttc), market credit spread measures in the 
spread between 3 year AA- corporate bond yields and 3 year treasury bond yields (yld), dummy variable for the 
interest rate environment (drate), market return measured in Korean index KOSPI’s quarterly return (mkt), dummy 
variable for the 1998 Asian Financial Crisis (dafc), dummy variable for the 2002 Credit Card Crisis in Korea (dccc), 
dummy variable for the 2008 Subprime Mortgage Crisis (dsmc) and dummy variable for the dividend 
cumulativeness (dcml). Each column represents regressions for four groups: (1) all preferred shares, (2) new 
convertible preferred shares, (3) new non-convertible preferred shares and (4) old preferred shares. It must be noted 
time to conversion (ttc) is only applicable to regression (2) given its convertibility. Given multicollinearity of 
dividend cumulativeness (dcml), we dropped dcml. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
All New Convertible New Non-Convertible Old Non-Convertible 
VARIABLES qdrp qdrp qdrp qdrp 
qdrc 1.0976*** 1.0778*** 1.4263*** 1.0812*** 
 
(59.882) (10.282) (20.650) (55.255) 
grth -0.0053** -0.0077 0.0008 -0.0068** 
 
(-2.003) (-0.579) (0.082) (-2.306) 
beta -0.0005 -0.0004 -0.0046** -0.0001 
 
(-0.712) (-0.166) (-2.253) (-0.148) 
liq -0.0001** -0.0002*** 0.0004* -0.0000 
 
(-2.403) (-2.827) (1.664) (-1.623) 
size -0.0077*** -0.0179** -0.0135*** -0.0055*** 
 
(-4.656) (-2.023) (-2.995) (-2.982) 
block 0.0026 -0.0194 -0.0299** 0.0067* 
 
(0.762) (-1.031) (-2.294) (1.892) 
dsbb 0.0016** -0.0010 -0.0037* 0.0026*** 
(1.982) (-0.282) (-1.898) (2.908) 
ttc 
 
0.0003 
 (0.485) 
lvrg 0.0024 0.0037 -0.0220* 0.0016 
(1.035) (0.351) (-1.663) (0.677) 
drate -0.0010 0.0039 -0.0029 -0.0014 
(-1.175) (1.133) (-1.078) (-1.434) 
yld 0.3734*** -0.1940 0.5972*** 0.4154*** 
(5.748) (-0.873) (3.226) (5.738) 
mkt 0.0063 -0.0175 -0.0032 0.0109** 
 
(1.583) (-1.219) (-0.272) (2.473) 
dafc 0.0112*** -0.0188*** 0.0118** 0.0149*** 
 
(5.565) (-2.658) (2.120) (6.594) 
dccc -0.0015 -0.0070 -0.0103* -0.0002 
 
(-0.809) (-1.108) (-1.908) (-0.095) 
dsmc -0.0031** -0.0097* -0.0100** -0.0012 
 
(-2.007) (-1.847) (-2.164) (-0.671) 
Constant 0.0804*** 0.1763** 0.1616*** 0.0588*** 
 
(5.232) (2.178) (3.821) (3.426) 
Observations 4,182 370 443 3,351 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-stat 341.55 12.68 45.01 300.95 
Adjusted R-squared 0.679 0.542 0.675 0.694 
t-statistics in parentheses 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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In regression (2) for convertible preferred shares, we have four independent variables 
with 95% significant coefficients; quarterly dividend yield of common shares (QDYC), dummy 
variable for the 1998 Asian Financial Crisis (dafc), relative liquidity of preferred shares over 
common shares (liq) and firm size (size). On average, QDYP is positively associated with 
QDYC and has significant coefficient of 1.0778 (t-value 10.282). The cost of common shares 
exerts significant influence on the cost of preferred shares. Relative liquidity of preferred shares 
is negatively associated with the QDYP with significant coefficient of -0.0002 (t-value -2.827). 
As seen both in Model 1 and Model 2, we see strong evidence for the liquidity premium. 
Interestingly, Model 2 has a significant negative coefficient of -0.0179 (t-value -2.023) 
for the size variable. Given the larger size, firms are more closely monitored by outsiders and 
may be exposed to less agency costs. Lastly, the dummy variable for the 1998 Asian Financial 
Crisis has a significant negative coefficient of -0.0188 (t-value -2.658) suggesting the cost of 
preferred share declined during the 1998 Asian Financial Crisis. Yet, we are cautious with this 
result as we have significant coefficients for other non-convertible preferred shares with the 
opposite positive signal. 
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CHAPTER VI. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
As seen in Tables 6.1 and 6.2, we conducted two robustness checks on different groups of 
preferred shares. In our robustness checks, we considered two important variables for preferred 
shares. First, we considered dividend cumulativeness as this provides significant protective 
features to dividend cash flow. Regarding the dividend cumulativeness, we run regression 1 
(cumulative) and regression 2 (non-cumulative). We focus on different regression results 
between the cumulative group and the non-cumulative groups. Second, we also considered the 
2008 Subprime Mortgage Crisis. The 2008 Crisis dramatically changed interest rates to zero or 
even minus rates. It lasted a long period of more than 10 years. We created two groups around 
the 2008 Subprime Mortgage Crisis. We run regression 3 (before the 2008 Crisis) and regression 
4 (after the 2008 Crisis). 
Table 6.1 Summary statistics - Robustness checks 
Table 6.1 presents sample statistics for the principle variables for Robustness checks. We grouped preferred shares 
into four groups. Panel A shows all preferred shares with cumulative dividends. Panel B shows all preferred shares 
with non-cumulative dividends. Panel C shows all preferred shares traded before the 2008 Crisis. Panel D shows all 
preferred shares traded after the 2008 Crisis. The dependent variable is the preferred share premium over common 
shares (prem). It has following dependent variables; dividend yield gap between preferred shares and common 
shares (dyg), beta of preferred shares measured in 30 day beta of the preferred shares (beta), relative liquidity of 
preferred shares compared to common shares (liq), firm size measured in log of total assets (size), block holding 
shares (block), leverage measured in debt-to-capital (lvrg), market yield spread measures in the spread between 3 
year AA- corporate bond yields and 3 year treasury bond yields (yld) and market return measured in Korean index 
KOSPI’s quarterly return (mkt). 
  Mean SD 5th pctl. 25th pctl. Median 75th pctl. 95th pctl. Obs. 
A. All preferred shares with cumulative dividends 
prem -0.1882 0.3812 -0.6117 -0.4309 -0.2758 -0.0820 0.6508 582 
dyg 0.0092 0.0256 -0.0158 0.0000 0.0042 0.0204 0.0374 582 
qdrp 0.0296 0.0345 0.0000 0.0000 0.0222 0.0479 0.0859 568 
qdrc 0.0199 0.0225 0.0000 0.0000 0.0159 0.0281 0.0598 568 
grth 0.0411 0.1336 -0.2751 -0.0251 0.0570 0.1109 0.2411 476 
beta 0.3941 0.4349 -0.1756 0.1312 0.3510 0.6138 1.1946 575 
liq 2.1124 4.8754 0.0560 0.2778 0.6254 1.5907 8.6661 582 
size 9.0207 0.5536 8.0597 8.6955 8.9859 9.2396 10.1231 564 
block 0.4481 0.1432 0.1845 0.3477 0.4468 0.5369 0.6788 567 
lvrg 0.4741 0.2588 0.0323 0.3527 0.5018 0.6080 0.8030 563 
yld 0.0082 0.0058 0.0032 0.0042 0.0074 0.0101 0.0147 582 
mkt 0.0293 0.1109 -0.1533 -0.0257 0.0233 0.0700 0.2280 582 
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B. All preferred shares with non-cumulative dividends 
prem -0.1790 1.1420 -0.7041 -0.5656 -0.4320 -0.2261 0.7761 4,302 
dyg 0.0137 0.0224 -0.0061 0.0003 0.0102 0.0225 0.0492 4,302 
qdrp 0.0316 0.0333 0.0000 0.0061 0.0240 0.0466 0.0920 4,178 
qdrc 0.0176 0.0208 0.0000 0.0035 0.0121 0.0236 0.0557 4,178 
grth 0.0853 0.1330 -0.0904 0.0164 0.0798 0.1385 0.2852 3,810 
beta 0.5242 0.4565 -0.1371 0.2269 0.4898 0.7972 1.2820 4,279 
liq 3.8056 16.1134 0.1066 0.3880 0.8331 2.1722 13.9677 4,302 
size 9.3594 0.8361 8.0389 8.7215 9.3744 9.9090 10.8473 4,197 
block 0.3903 0.1669 0.1605 0.2597 0.3640 0.4871 0.7257 4,200 
lvrg 0.4181 0.2352 0.0133 0.2572 0.4548 0.5765 0.7310 4,172 
yld 0.0079 0.0056 0.0029 0.0042 0.0067 0.0099 0.0147 4,302 
mkt 0.0303 0.1108 -0.1533 -0.0310 0.0233 0.0700 0.2280 4,302 
C. All preferred shares traded before 2008 subprime mortgage crisis 
prem -0.1729 1.0472 -0.6426 -0.5205 -0.3984 -0.1952 0.7159 2,274 
dyg 0.0148 0.0286 -0.0176 0.0000 0.0119 0.0258 0.0631 2,274 
qdrp 0.0384 0.0412 0.0000 0.0022 0.0293 0.0566 0.1196 2,274 
qdrc 0.0234 0.0260 0.0000 0.0037 0.0166 0.0324 0.0750 2,274 
grth 0.1053 0.1530 -0.0795 0.0276 0.0894 0.1590 0.3486 1,902 
beta 0.5213 0.4167 -0.1007 0.2324 0.4896 0.7781 1.2515 2,251 
liq 2.9246 15.9274 0.1392 0.4295 0.9402 2.0200 8.3137 2,274 
size 9.1907 0.8079 7.8709 8.5982 9.0785 9.7494 10.6666 2,263 
block 0.3651 0.1597 0.1568 0.2506 0.3426 0.4547 0.6893 2,157 
lvrg 0.4475 0.2557 0.0110 0.2811 0.4746 0.6128 0.7667 2,263 
yld 0.0079 0.0036 0.0032 0.0042 0.0077 0.0111 0.0147 2,274 
mkt 0.0567 0.1350 -0.1590 -0.0257 0.0581 0.1363 0.3270 2,274 
D. All preferred shares traded after 2008 subprime mortgage crisis 
prem -0.1863 1.1076 -0.7219 -0.5883 -0.4255 -0.2067 0.8077 2,610 
dyg 0.0117 0.0162 -0.0025 0.0011 0.0085 0.0193 0.0383 2,610 
qdrp 0.0249 0.0224 0.0000 0.0063 0.0203 0.0388 0.0658 2,472 
qdrc 0.0128 0.0131 0.0000 0.0029 0.0096 0.0182 0.0386 2,472 
grth 0.0605 0.1123 -0.1153 0.0000 0.0629 0.1229 0.2242 2,384 
beta 0.4979 0.4870 -0.1702 0.2000 0.4556 0.7727 1.2884 2,603 
liq 4.1957 14.5642 0.0829 0.3242 0.7073 2.2304 18.0581 2,610 
size 9.4358 0.8043 8.3690 8.7898 9.3497 9.9874 11.0540 2,498 
block 0.4236 0.1653 0.1710 0.3050 0.4101 0.5056 0.7334 2,610 
lvrg 0.4039 0.2201 0.0178 0.2606 0.4441 0.5407 0.7060 2,472 
yld 0.0081 0.0069 0.0025 0.0042 0.0053 0.0094 0.0318 2,610 
mkt 0.0071 0.0770 -0.1533 -0.0310 0.0215 0.0475 0.1402 2,610 
 
Table 6.2 OLS regression results - Robustness checks 
Table 6.2 presents OLS regression estimates for robustness checks. The dependent variable is the preferred share 
premium over common shares. The independent variables are dividend yield gap between preferred shares and 
common shares (dyg), 5 year trailing revenue compound growth rate (grth), beta of preferred shares measured in 30 
day beta of the preferred shares (beta), relative liquidity of the preferred shares compared to common shares (liq), 
firm size measured in log of total assets (size), block holding shares (block), dummy variable for the share buyback 
(dsbb), leverage measured in debt-to-capital (lvrg), dummy variable for the rate environment (drate), market yield 
spread measures in the spread between 3 year AA- corporate bond yields and 3 year treasury bond yields (yld) and 
market return measured in Korean index KOSPI’s quarterly return (mkt). Dummy variable for the 1998 Asian 
Financial Crisis (dafc), dummy variable for the 2002 Credit Card Crisis in Korea (dccc) and dummy variable for the 
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2008 Subprime Mortgage Crisis (dsmc) are not applicable to the Robustness Checks given their focus on the 2008 
Subprime Mortgage Crisis. Each column represents regressions for four groups: (1) all preferred shares with 
cumulative dividends, (2) all preferred shares with non-cumulative dividends, (3) all preferred shares with trading 
before the 2008 Crisis and (4) all preferred shares with trading after the 2008 Subprime Mortgage Crisis. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Cumulative Non-Cumulative Before 2008 After 2008 
VARIABLES prem prem prem prem 
dyg -0.7391* -5.5076*** -2.9233*** -5.6287*** 
(-1.925) (-7.937) (-4.078) (-5.767) 
grth 0.0736 -0.0048 0.0057 -0.3259** 
 
(0.804) (-0.045) (0.035) (-2.072) 
beta -0.0055 -0.0061 -0.0390 0.0607** 
 
(-0.252) (-0.199) (-0.825) (2.189) 
liq 0.0037 0.0048*** 0.0030** 0.0070*** 
(1.296) (5.521) (2.352) (7.768) 
size -0.3866*** -0.0947 0.1356 -0.2629** 
 
(-7.847) (-1.361) (1.123) (-2.434) 
block 0.5853*** -1.0499*** -0.0991 -0.7464*** 
 
(4.948) (-7.508) (-0.538) (-3.475) 
dsbb 0.0095 0.0319 0.1313*** 0.0043 
(0.357) (0.982) (2.947) (0.127) 
lvrg -0.0601 0.0872 0.1767 0.3125** 
 
(-0.970) (0.901) (1.480) (2.196) 
drate -0.1125*** -0.0128 -0.0009 -0.1136** 
 
(-4.319) (-0.345) (-0.020) (-2.261) 
yld -1.2874 -1.5672 25.1761*** -4.5792* 
(-0.683) (-0.573) (3.750) (-1.766) 
mkt -0.4604*** -0.5880*** -0.5509*** -0.5433** 
 
(-3.719) (-3.555) (-3.122) (-2.540) 
Constant 3.1361*** 1.1810* -1.6109 2.5825*** 
 
(7.157) (1.825) (-1.434) (2.604) 
Observations 464 3,718 1,811 2,371 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-stat 12.93 14.88 6.56 18.15 
Adjusted R-squared 0.736 0.620 0.648 0.753 
t-statistics in parentheses 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
From the four regressions, we have confirmed the negative relation between the dividend 
yield gaps and the preferred share premium with 95% confidence intervals. This supports our 
result for Model 1. Regarding liquidity, except regression 1 (cumulative), all regressions 
supported the positive liquidity premium. This confirms the liquidity premium shown in Model 1. 
It is interesting for all of the four groups in our robustness checks the market return (mkt) has 
shown 99% significant coefficients indicating negative relations between the market returns and 
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the preferred share premium. This supports hypothesis 6 that the premium of convertible 
preferred shares over common shares is negatively related to market movements and sentiments. 
As discussed in our descriptive statistics, we hypothesized that the dividend 
cumulativeness exerts significant influences on the valuation of preferred shares. We found 
interesting differences between the cumulative group and the non-cumulative group. First, the 
liquidity variable is significant for the non-cumulative group with 99% confidence interval but is 
insignificant for the cumulative group. The assured cash flow provides greater protection to the 
holders of the cumulative preferred shares than the holders of the non-cumulative preferred 
shares. This makes the non-cumulative preferred shares more sensitive to the liquidity. Second, 
the cumulative group has shown a significant negative coefficient in the size variable, while the 
non-cumulative group has insignificant relations with the size variable. Lastly, it is quite 
interesting that the coefficients for the block holding have opposite signals, with a positive 
coefficient for the cumulative group and a negative coefficient for the non-cumulative group. 
This suggests the cash flow guarantee of the cumulative preferred shares leads into the greater 
value of the block holding shares. The different results suggest that the cumulative dividends are 
an important factor in determining the values of preferred shares. 
Additionally, given the binding cash flow, the cumulative dividends may make the 
preferred shares more bond-like with significant relations to the credit market related variables. It 
is interesting that the dummy variable for the interest rate environment has a significant negative 
coefficient (coefficient -0.1125 and t-value -4.319) for the cumulative preferred shares. Like a 
bond, the higher market interest rates result in the lower prices of the cumulative preferred shares. 
Furthermore, to clearly observe the valuation difference between the three types of the 
preferred shares, in Table 6.3 we introduced dummy variables for the three types of the preferred 
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shares and their interactions with the six interest rate related variables. The three dummy 
variables are dummy variable for new convertible preferred shares (dncv), dummy variable for 
new non-convertible preferred shares (dnnc) and dummy variable for old preferred shares (dold). 
In Table 6.3, we find interesting patterns in the regression results. First, as seen in column (2), (3) 
and (4), each of the three dummy variables shows significant coefficients for dncv, dnnc and 
dold within 99% confidence intervals. Also, we need to note that dummy variables for new 
convertible preferred shares and new non-convertible preferred shares have positive coefficients, 
while dummy variable for old preferred shares have negative coefficient. This suggests that the 
types of the preferred shares are major determinants of the preferred shares valuation. The 
signals of the coefficients support our mathematical reasoning explained with equations (5.1), 
(5.2) and (5.3) that there are significant values for convertibility and cumulative dividends. 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.3 Introducing dummy variables and interactions 
Table 6.3 introduces dummy variables for new convertible preferred shares (dncv), new non-convertible preferred 
shares (dnnc), old non-convertible preferred shares (dold) and their interactions with interest related variables 
including dividend yield gap between preferred shares and common shares (dyg), relative liquidity of the preferred 
shares compared to common shares (liq), block holding shares (block), market return measured in Korean index 
KOSPI’s quarterly return (mkt), dummy variable for the 1998 Asian Financial Crisis (dafc) and dummy variable for 
the 2008 Subprime Mortgage Crisis (dsmc). Table 6.3 presents OLS regression on the above variables setting 
premium as a dependent variable. In addition to the new variables, the independent variables for this regression are 
dividend yield gap between preferred shares and common shares (dyg), 5 year trailing revenue compound growth 
rate (grth), beta of preferred shares measured in 30 day beta of the preferred shares (beta), relative liquidity of the 
preferred shares compared to common shares (liq), firm size measured in log of total assets (size), block holding 
shares (block), dummy variable for the share buyback (dsbb), time to conversion (ttc), leverage measured in debt-to-
capital (lvrg), dummy variable for the rate environment (drate), market yield spread measures in the spread between 
3 year AA- corporate bond yields and 3 year treasury bond yields (yld), market return measured in Korean index 
KOSPI’s quarterly return (mkt), dummy variable for the 1998 Asian Financial Crisis (dafc), dummy variable for the 
2002 Credit Card Crisis in Korea (dccc) and dummy variable for the 2008 Subprime Mortgage Crisis (dsmc). Each 
column represents regressions for six groups: (1) all preferred shares without the new dummy variables, (2) all 
preferred shares with dncv, (3) all preferred shares with dnnc, (4) all preferred shares with dold, (5) all preferred 
shares with dncv interactions and (6) all preferred shares with dnnc interactions. 
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  All dncv dnnc dold dncv  dnnc 
 
interactions interations 
VARIABLES prem prem prem prem prem prem 
              
dyg -8.0744*** -4.8194*** -8.1343*** -7.0013*** -6.8722*** -6.4946*** 
 
(-10.118) (-6.362) (-10.204) (-9.024) (-9.394) (-7.874) 
grth -0.3542*** -0.3951*** -0.3653*** -0.4758*** -0.4732*** -0.4004*** 
(-2.752) (-3.284) (-2.841) (-3.809) (-4.200) (-3.154) 
beta -0.1426*** -0.1196*** -0.1339*** -0.1190*** -0.1226*** -0.1405*** 
 
(-3.628) (-3.254) (-3.403) (-3.122) (-3.565) (-3.613) 
liq 0.0074*** 0.0071*** 0.0076*** 0.0078*** 0.0042*** 0.0072*** 
 
(6.191) (6.343) (6.285) (6.713) (3.796) (6.068) 
size -0.0543*** -0.0534*** -0.0575*** 0.0031 -0.0383*** -0.0514*** 
(-7.517) (-7.909) (-7.907) (0.392) (-6.041) (-7.195) 
block 0.8557*** 0.5788*** 0.8746*** 0.9263*** 0.2178** 0.8220*** 
 
(8.582) (6.166) (8.770) (9.579) (2.441) (8.305) 
dsbb 0.1005** 0.1235*** 0.0836* 0.0479 0.0937** 0.1138*** 
 
(2.352) (3.092) (1.946) (1.153) (2.506) (2.685) 
lvrg 0.2314*** 0.2802*** 0.2272*** 0.2267*** 0.3274*** 0.2079*** 
(3.118) (4.039) (3.066) (3.153) (5.035) (2.844) 
drate 0.0574 0.0087 0.0586 0.0496 0.0143 0.0550 
 
(1.188) (0.192) (1.215) (1.060) (0.339) (1.157) 
yld 4.7752 1.6803 5.0731 5.3900 2.6466 4.5255 
 
(1.270) (0.478) (1.351) (1.480) (0.803) (1.224) 
mkt -0.2836 -0.3584* -0.2672 -0.2101 -0.2779 -0.4268* 
(-1.240) (-1.677) (-1.170) (-0.948) (-1.347) (-1.836) 
dafc 0.3116*** 0.2512** 0.3134*** 0.3083*** 0.3598*** -0.0421 
 
(2.724) (2.348) (2.743) (2.782) (3.432) (-0.358) 
dccc 0.0521 0.0053 0.0547 0.0531 0.0358 0.0588 
 
(0.480) (0.052) (0.504) (0.505) (0.376) (0.550) 
dsmc -0.1553* -0.1181 -0.1563* -0.1422 -0.1114 -0.1744* 
(-1.731) (-1.408) (-1.744) (-1.635) (-1.364) (-1.910) 
dcml -0.1500*** -0.7432*** -0.1500*** -0.4062*** -0.7106*** -0.1193** 
 
(-2.762) (-13.221) (-2.766) (-7.405) (-13.769) (-2.225) 
dncv_dyg 42.3485*** 
(12.904) 
 dncv_liq 
 
0.0375*** 
 (10.060) 
dncv_block 
 
3.0321*** 
 (22.392) 
 dncv_mkt -0.5652 
(-1.006) 
 dncv_dafc 
 
0.2043 
 (0.687) 
dncv_dsmc 
 
-0.1393 
 (-0.636) 
 dncv 1.5149*** 
(24.573) 
 dnnc 
 
0.1930*** 
 (3.505) 
dold 
 
-0.6896*** 
 (-16.537) 
 dnnc_dyg -16.9501*** 
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(-6.966) 
dnnc_liq 
 
0.0317*** 
 
(2.634) 
dnnc_block 
 
0.0012 
 
(0.007) 
dnnc_mkt 
 
1.0858* 
 
(1.756) 
dnnc_dafc 
 
3.3436*** 
 
(10.327) 
dnnc_dsmc 
 
0.0715 
 
(0.285) 
 Observations 4,182 4,182 4,182 4,182 4,182 4,182 
F-Stat 31.73 71.78 30.59 48.78 91.04 30.39 
Adjusted R-squared 0.099 0.213 0.102 0.155 0.311 0.129 
t-statistics in parentheses 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
Second, we also find the regression results for the interactions with the three type dummy 
variables worth to further emphasize. In both regression (5) and regression (6), the interactions 
with relative liquidity (dncv_liq and dnnc_liq) have shown positive significant coefficients 
within 99% confidence intervals. Coefficients for dncv_liq and dnnc_liq are 0.0375 (t-value 
10.060) and 0.0317 (t-value 2.634). This suggests that the valuation of the new preferred shares 
is positively associated with relative liquidity. This supports the liquidity premium observed in 
Table 5.2 Model 1 regression. 
 
Table 5.2 OLS regression results - Premium as a dependent variable 
Table 5.2 presents OLS regression estimates for Model 1 – premium as a dependent variable. The dependent 
variable is the preferred share premium. The independent variables are dividend yield gap between preferred shares 
and common shares (dyg), 5 year trailing revenue compound growth rate (grth), beta of preferred shares measured in 
30 day beta of the preferred shares (beta), relative liquidity of the preferred shares compared to common shares (liq), 
firm size measured in log of total assets (size), block holding shares (block), dummy variable for the share buyback 
(dsbb), time to conversion (ttc), leverage measured in debt-to-capital (lvrg), dummy variable for the rate 
environment (drate), market yield spread measures in the spread between 3 year AA- corporate bond yields and 3 
year treasury bond yields (yld), market return measured in Korean index KOSPI’s quarterly return (mkt), dummy 
variable for the 1998 Asian Financial Crisis (dafc), dummy variable for the 2002 Credit Card Crisis in Korea (dccc) 
and dummy variable for the 2008 Subprime Mortgage Crisis (dsmc). Each column represents regressions for four 
groups: (1) all preferred shares, (2) new convertible preferred shares, (3) new non-convertible preferred shares and 
(4) old preferred shares. It must be noted time to conversion (ttc) is only applicable to regression (2) given its 
convertibility. Given multicollinearity of dividend cumulativeness (dcml), we dropped dcml. 
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
All New Convertible New Non-Convertible Old Non-Convertible 
VARIABLES prem prem prem prem 
dyg -4.8124*** -11.0384*** -25.4451*** -2.9477*** 
(-8.172) (-3.303) (-7.043) (-6.990) 
grth 0.0212 -0.0582 -0.6633 -0.1238* 
 
(0.220) (-0.110) (-0.957) (-1.757) 
beta 0.0032 0.0120 -0.0952 0.0071 
 
(0.117) (0.115) (-0.637) (0.351) 
liq 0.0047*** 0.0324*** 0.0216 0.0018*** 
(5.666) (9.635) (1.400) (3.070) 
size -0.1253** -0.4033 0.4682 -0.1996*** 
 
(-2.047) (-1.139) (1.403) (-4.420) 
block -0.9123*** 0.6081 -9.8743*** -0.2993*** 
 
(-7.255) (0.818) (-10.413) (-3.413) 
dsbb 0.03 0.0053 0.2780* -0.0409* 
-1.021 (0.038) (1.955) (-1.855) 
ttc 
 
0.0945*** 
 (4.123) 
 lvrg 0.0737 1.9312*** 2.7443*** -0.1613*** 
 
(0.873) (4.587) (2.883) (-2.741) 
drate -0.0183 -0.2347* 0.4064** -0.0359 
(-0.556) (-1.700) (2.096) (-1.497) 
yld -1.9007 0.6773 9.1105 -3.7710** 
 
(-0.781) (0.075) (0.670) (-2.094) 
mkt -0.5838*** -0.2435 -2.6580*** -0.3872*** 
 
(-3.933) (-0.419) (-3.154) (-3.560) 
dafc 0.1984*** 0.1686 1.7051*** -0.0068 
(2.639) (0.570) (4.151) (-0.122) 
dccc 0.0229 0.1471 0.3160 0.0230 
 
(0.324) (0.580) (0.808) (0.438) 
dsmc -0.1791*** -0.1106 -1.1640*** -0.0726* 
 
(-3.081) (-0.521) (-3.448) (-1.695) 
Constant 1.4062** 3.9824 -1.9543 1.8277*** 
(2.488) (1.238) (-0.621) (4.391) 
Observations 4,182 370 443 3,351 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-stat 15.53 13.49 18.29 12.55 
Adjusted R-squared 0.619 0.889 0.532 0.346 
t-statistics in parentheses 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
In regression (5), the other two interactions of dncv_dyg and dncv_block have shown 
significant positive coefficients. This confirms there are positive relations between the valuation 
new convertible preferred shares and dividend yield gaps and block holding shares. In contrast to 
regression (5), regression (6) has opposite results in terms of dncv_dyg and dncv_blocks 
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interactions. This implies the convertibility exerts contrasting influences on dividend yield gaps 
and block holding shares. 
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CHAPTER VII. CONCLUSION 
We have found that the convertible preferred share premium over the common shares in 
Korea is -4% on median in contrast to -43% and -44% for the new non-convertible preferred 
shares and the old non-convertible preferred shares, respectively. By comparing different values 
among common shares, convertible preferred shares and non-convertible preferred shares, we 
calculated that 43% and 39% of common shares are values for voting rights and dividend 
cumulativeness, respectively. This suggests that there are significant values for the corporate 
governance related values and the dividend cumulativeness. The time series analysis on the 
relation between the convertible preferred share premium and time to conversion indicates that 
the corporate governance related values are discounted by time and getting more valuable as 
approaching to the conversion. We also found profitable arbitrage trading opportunities between 
the convertible preferred shares and the common shares. This thesis provides new evidences for 
the values of convertibility, voting rights and dividend guarantees. 
We have run two models of OLS regressions to test six hypotheses on the fundamental 
factors explaining the convertible preferred share premium. Our empirical results suggest that the 
convertible preferred share premium is negatively associated with the dividend yield gap. This is 
probably due to the voting right recovery function of the preferred shares during the dividend 
omission. On average, the convertible preferred share premium is positively associated with 
leverage and time to conversion. In sum, the dividend yield guarantees, leverage, and 
convertibility exert significant influence on the convertible preferred shares premium. 
This thesis focuses on the convertible preferred share premium in Korean market. We 
believe promising future research areas will be 1) expansion of this research into other markets, 2) 
deeper inquisition into preferred shares of financial firms and restructuring firms, which 
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effectively use the preferred shares as an important capital policy tool, 3) exploring more 
theoretical discussions on the equity-bond dichotomy between the convertible preferred shares 
and the other two non-convertible preferred shares and 4) development of a mathematical 
valuation model and its proofs for the convertible preferred shares.
  
 
APPENDIX A. DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES 
Variables Notation Original Adjusted Data Source Description 
Preferred share premium prem Daily Quarterly Datastream 
(Preferred share price - Common share price)/Common share 
price, Calculated daily and then averaged them into a quarterly 
base 
Quarter dividend yield of 
preferred share qdyp Annual Quarterly Datastream PS dividend at year end/ average PS price over a quarter 
Quarter dividend yield of 
common share qdyc Annual Quarterly Datastream CS dividend at year end/ average CS price over a quarter 
Dividend yield gap dyg Annual Quarterly Datastream 
Dividend yield of Preferred share - Dividend yield of Common 
share, Used year end annual dividend for interim quarters of 
the year 
Control: Long-term growth grth Annual Quarterly Datastream Trailing 5-year CAGR revenue growth. Used annual revenue 
Control: Beta beta Daily Quarterly Datastream 30-day common share beta. Used market index KOSPI and common share price for returns 
Control: Relative liquidity liq Daily Quarterly Datastream 
Liquidity of the preferred shares relative to the liquidity of 
common shares 
LCS (liquidity of CS = Volume of CS / total CS outstanding) 
LPS (liquidity of PS) = Volume of PS / total PS outstanding) 
The ratio RL (relative liquidity) = LPS/LCS 
Control: Size size Annual Quarterly Datastream Measured firm size with log of total assets 
Shareholdings of block 
holders block Quarterly Quarterly Public filing 
Collected shareholdings of block holders of common shares 
Gathered them from the DART quarterly filing 
Control: share buyback dsbb Quarterly Quarterly Datastream 
Calculated quarterly changes in shares outstanding 
Identified with reduced shares outstanding with reasonable size 
as shares buyback. A dummy variable for share buyback=1 and 
otherwise=0 
Leverage lvrg Annual Quarterly Datastream 
Datastream calculated annual debt-to-capital ratio 
(Long Term Debt + Short Term Debt + Current Portion of 
Long Term Debt) / (Total Capital + Short Term Debt + Current 
Portion of Long Term Debt) x 100 
Time to conversion ttc Quarterly Quarterly Public filing 
Measures time to conversion. For example, for 10 years of time 
to conversion, 
-10 + lapsed number of quarters x 0.25 
Market yield yld Daily Quarterly Bank of Korea 
The spread between yield on 3-year AA- grade corporate bond 
and 3-year Treasury bond 
Calculated daily ratio and then averaged them into a quarterly 
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base 
Control: Rate drate Quarterly Quarterly Datastream 
A dummy variable for the market rate environment with the 
high rate environment =1 and otherwise =0. Defined the high 
rate environment as the rate higher than 5.17%, the 19 year 
average rate for the 3 year AA- corporate bond yield 
Market return mkt Daily Quarterly Datastream 
Using market index KOSPI, averaged quarter level and 
calculated their returns 
(Quarter average of index Q1 - Quarter average of index Q2)/  
Quarter average of index Q2 
Control: Crisis 1 dafc Quarterly Quarterly Datastream 
A dummy variable for Asian Financial Crisis with crisis=1 and 
otherwise=0 
Defined a crisis as quarterly market retreat of greater than 5% 
DAFC covers period from 3Q 1998 to 4Q 2000 
Control: Crisis 2 dccc Quarterly Quarterly Datastream 
A dummy variable for Korea Credit Card Crisis with crisis=1 
and otherwise=0 
Defined a crisis as quarterly market retreat of greater than 5% 
DCCC covers period from 2Q 2002 to 1Q 2003 
Control: Crisis 3 dsmc Quarterly Quarterly Datastream 
A dummy variable for Subprime Mortgage Crisis with crisis=1 
and otherwise=0 
Defined a crisis as quarterly market retreat of greater than 5% 
DSMC covers period from 1Q 2008 to 4Q 2008 
Dividend cumulativeness dcml Quarterly Quarterly Public filing 
A dummy variable for dividend cumulativeness with 
cumulative=1 and otherwise=0 
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